

bulletin



U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN REVIEW 43

WITNESSING THE BIRTH OF A NEW WORLD 45

U.S. SUPPORT FOR EARLY AUSTRIAN TREATY 57

AMERICAN CITIZENS OF THE U.N. SECRETARIAT 57

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE TO EXPAND MEMBERS IN 58



The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXVIII, No. 707 • PUBLICATION 4857

January 12, 1953

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

U.S.

White

Yo
porta
day.
broad
our f
dome
The
lows
its m
do ab
at ho

W
what
and l
and c
happ
Ou
ing, i
to res

Yo
oppo
count
gener
lems
today
you a
how
tions
you l

I w
peace
it int
There
now t
prehe
ment
of th
clear
our f

¹ Ma
Dec. 1

Janu

U.S. Foreign Policy in Review

*Address by the President*¹

White House press release dated December 19

You men are engaged in one of the most important studies that Americans can engage in today. You are studying our national policy in its broadest sense. Our national policy is not simply our foreign policy or our military policy or our domestic policy. It is a combination of all three. The internal domestic policies which a nation follows are the foundations of its foreign policy and its military policy. What we can do and ought to do abroad depends upon the kind of nation we are at home.

We are, above all else, a peaceful nation, and what we want most in the world is peace—a just and lasting peace that will release the constructive and creative energies of mankind and increase the happiness of men and women everywhere.

Our national policy, the policy you are studying, in all its aspects, is simply a policy designed to reach that objective. It is a policy for peace.

You who are privileged to study here have an opportunity that is available nowhere else in our country. You are given facts that cannot be generally publicized. You can look at the problems confronting the United States in the world today clearly, steadily, and as a whole. I am sure you appreciate this opportunity and understand how important this background will be in the positions of high responsibility you will occupy when you leave here.

I want to talk to you today about this policy for peace and what our country has been doing to put it into effect since the end of the World War II. There has never been a greater need than there is now to think about these matters clearly and comprehensively. We must try to do this with detachment and without partisan bias. The situation of the world is such that anything less than our clearest and wisest judgment may be disastrous to our future.

¹ Made at the National War College, Washington, on Dec. 19.

If we look back over what we have done since the end of World War II, I think we can say that we have been successful in laying the foundations for a structure of peace. Things which were merely principles in 1945 and only blueprints in 1947 and 1948 have now become established realities—growing and living institutions.

We have done a great deal and we have done it very rapidly in the past 7 years. Some of our policies have been successful and some have not, but, by and large, it can be said that we have created the basic framework that is necessary to resist aggression and to uphold the principles of the United Nations. Whether that structure will succeed depends upon a number of factors, including the degree to which we give it material support. But the progress we have already made gives us confidence that we can succeed.

1945 and Our Hasty Demobilization

At the end of World War II, the people of the United States were anxious to return to peaceful concerns. We wanted to forget about the problems of national security and national defense. We were indeed too eager to do this, and, in our hasty demobilization, we impatiently threw away a good deal of what we needed.

A little more than 7 years ago, in a speech which I made in New York on October 27, 1945,² I pointed out that we needed to continue to have strong armed forces and a universal training program. I said that we needed these things in order to enforce the terms of the peace, to fulfill the military obligations which we were undertaking as a member of the United Nations, and to protect the United States and the Western Hemisphere.

To many people these statements sounded like strange talk in 1945. In those days, few of us realized that we would need strong defenses and trained manpower. Some people still don't see why we have to have universal military training.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1945, p. 653.

But the intervening years have proved that this was the right position to take in 1945. A new danger was then beginning to appear—a danger which has since become quite familiar. That was the refusal of one of our former allies to cooperate in the efforts of the free nations to build a peaceful world. That nation—that former ally—set out to expand its own power by taking advantage of the weariness and yearning for peace that was prevalent throughout the world in the chaotic aftermath of the war.

This threat was global. It was sustained and persistent. It included political subversion, economic stratagems, and military and diplomatic pressure. It was aimed at all free nations, wherever weakness might appear, and most particularly at the nations in Europe and Asia bordering on the territory dominated by the Soviet Union.

To meet this threat we had to devise new plans and programs. We had to develop measures that were new, that went beyond many of our traditions and experiences. I think that we have met this problem, and on the whole we have met it successfully. The American people did develop new measures to meet this postwar threat to freedom. These measures have by now become so familiar to us that many of us tend to forget what they are designed to do.

Our first objective is to preserve peace in the world. Our determination to do that was very clearly stated, I think, in the same speech I made in October 1945 setting forth the principles that were to guide us in international affairs. I said then that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world but that we are prepared to use our military strength to fulfill our obligations as a member of the United Nations. Along with this, I stressed our conviction that it is essential that there be no territorial changes which are not in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned and that no government be imposed on any nation by the force of any foreign power.

That was said in 1945. We recognized at that time that there were limitations on what this country could do to make that declaration effective. We knew we could not prevent subversion or conquest everywhere in the world. But we engaged ourselves to stand firmly behind the United Nations and to use our resources to make freedom secure for ourselves and for others.

Bolstering the Free Nations' Internal Strength

Our first problem was to help the free nations strengthen themselves as rapidly as possible. The war and its aftermath had seriously weakened them. Destruction, economic chaos, hunger, political turmoil—all appeared to open the way for Communist subversion. The human misery and confusion in Europe and Asia aroused Communist expectations of easy opportunities for expansion.

The free nations had to have new internal strength before they could resist Communist pressure.

In 1947 we moved first to help the people of Greece. Their national independence was threatened by foreign intrigue, guerrilla warfare, and military pressure. We gave them military and economic aid. Greece did not lose its independence. The elements that were trying to destroy that independence were defeated. The Greek people recovered, to stand beside the people of Turkey in defense of freedom and stability in the area of the eastern Mediterranean.

Next, we moved to bolster the internal strength of the nations of Western Europe. By their own efforts alone they were unable to recover from the terrible economic devastation of the war. Communist imperialism, using political weapons, was moving rapidly to take over their governments. We set out to give to these peoples economic assistance and a sense of hope and confidence in the future.

Moving ahead another step in our program to keep the peace, we signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. This joined the free nations of the Atlantic area in a pact which was something much more than a traditional military alliance. It was instead a permanent partnership in the task of maintaining and assuring the peace. It brought the countries of Western Europe into closer economic and military unity.

These measures have, up to now, been successful. Never has the United States made a better investment in security.

The peoples of Western Europe did not succumb to panic and despair; they did not yield their freedom to internal subversion or to outside intimidation. The peoples of Western Europe are not in Communist hands today and they are not going to be. The economies of these countries recovered, despite the embittered efforts of the Communists to prevent it. Today, the military potential of these Western European peoples is growing. This is of tremendous importance to the world. The men and machines of Western Europe are a key factor in preserving peace and freedom. If they should fall under Communist control, the scales of world power would shift drastically in favor of Communist imperialism.

We have also had to meet Communist efforts to gain control over the two great peoples on the western and the eastern borders of the Soviet Union—Germany and Japan. Here, too, we have been largely successful.

That part of Germany not occupied by Communist forces—and it is the greater part—has been enabled to maintain its freedom. We have helped it toward a position of full sovereign equality in the community of free nations. We hope that it will become an important part of the newly emerging united Europe.

On the other side of the world, the Communists have also been thwarted in seeking the political

capt
train
Gove
of P
Japa
An
peac
coun
arran
TH
wher
Kore
the c
said,
port
terna
I K
the
stren
later
have
and t
Th
unde
resist
to pr
Comm
our a
the C
the p
aim l
Th
cause
But i
By
restor
muni
for a
a ter
deal
how m
ing in
Acco
If
Unite
all ou
system
stroye
the fr
fore c
The
last 7
a desi
It is
want
hind t
streng
prove
which
is a p

capture of Japan, with its industries and its trained manpower. We have signed with the Government of Japan a fair and generous Treaty of Peace. We have shown our confidence in the Japanese people.

Another step in carrying out our policy for peace was taken when we joined with other free countries in the Pacific area in a series of security arrangements.

This whole policy of ours met its greatest test when the Communists attacked the Republic of Korea. That was the great challenge—that was the crisis that decided whether we meant what we said, whether we were really determined to support the United Nations and the concept of international law and order.

I believe the Communists were bent on testing the authority of the United Nations and the strength of the free countries by force sooner or later. If the test had not come in Korea, it would have come somewhere else. But it came in Korea, and that was where we had to meet it and stop it.

The Communist aim was to bring South Korea under Communist domination, to demoralize the resistance of the free nations to communism, and to prepare the way for attacks elsewhere. The Communists have failed to achieve this end. But our aim, which was to repel the attack, to support the Charter of the United Nations, and to prevent the piecemeal conquest of other free nations—this aim has been achieved.

This conflict has taken tragic sacrifices. It has caused impatience and disagreements among us. But in spite of this, we have stood firm.

By every possible means we have been trying to restore peace and security in Korea. The Communists have refused the opportunity we offered for an honorable end to the fighting. The result is a terrible and a serious problem. But while we deal with this problem, let us not lose sight of how much we have already accomplished by fighting in Korea.

Accomplishments in Korea

If the attack had been allowed to succeed, the United Nations would have been shattered, and all our hopes of building up a collective-security system for the free nations would have been destroyed. If we had failed to meet the test there, the free world today might well be in retreat before communism on a dozen other fronts.

The foreign policy we have developed in these last 7 years is not a negative one. It is not simply a design to resist communism. It is much more. It is a program of going forward, overcoming want and poverty, and enlarging freedom. Behind the shield of defensive alliances and military strength, it is our purpose to help people to improve their conditions of life—to create a world in which democracy and freedom can flourish. This is a part of our total policy which is uppermost in

my concern. It is affirmative, creative, and constructive.

Through the Point Four Program, through measures of economic development, we are moving to bring modern technological progress into the reach of other peoples so that they can help themselves to raise their standard of living.

In the Helping-Hand Tradition

This kind of activity comes naturally to us. It is close to the helping-hand tradition of the American frontier. But today it has a new significance. For the majority of the people of the world live in what are called "underdeveloped areas." These people are determined to conquer poverty and disease and misery. We can show them how to do it. With patience and understanding, we can help them adapt the methods of modern science to their own needs.

Our programs of technical cooperation, our information programs, our exchanges of books and people—all are intended to broaden the horizons of freedom and progress in the world. Furthermore, they are a vital weapon against Communist imperialism. They show that the genuine road to progress is the way of freedom. They show that the deeds of free men are better than the false promises of communism.

In carrying out all these steps I have been describing, we have experienced both successes and failures. In this great world struggle there have been some burdens we could not undertake because our resources were not unlimited.

China was one of those. With all our material help, and it was very large, the Government of China was not able to save itself.

Let no one think that this Administration underestimates the effects of the Communist victory in China. We know that the capture of the great Chinese people by a clique of ruthless Communist fanatics was a tragic loss to the cause of peace and progress in Asia and elsewhere. We hope it will not be an irrevocable loss.

It is very easy now to look at some particular part of the whole world problem and say we did the wrong thing there. But those who criticize past decisions rarely look at the entire balance sheet of our assets and commitments and tell us what things we should have dropped in order to do the things they think we should have done. They forget that our power is not unlimited and that we cannot commit ourselves everywhere.

I do believe, however, that we have by and large succeeded in the main purposes to which we have set ourselves and our resources. We have demonstrated to the Communists that their expansionist efforts will be checked.

The sum total of the actions we have taken and which I have briefly described has now brought us, I believe, to a situation in which it should become clear to the Soviet leaders that they cannot

gain their objectives by the use of force. They know this country is becoming strong. They know the strength and unity of the free nations is mounting. They can gain nothing from war but catastrophe.

In recognizing our progress, we must not belittle the dangers that still lie ahead.

The Soviet leaders have not abandoned their purposes. They are persistent and determined. Even if they turn away from outright aggression, they still hope to win. More and more I think they are placing their hopes of victory on factors in the free world which they think will work to their advantage. They are placing their hopes above all on the differences and disagreements among the free countries, particularly between ourselves and the others. To this end they are conducting against the people of the United States the most shameless, cynical, and terrible campaign of vilification that has ever been conducted against an entire people anywhere.

We must not underrate the dangers this involves.

Our great wealth and our responsibilities as a leading world power have led to much resentment and misunderstanding, even among other free and friendly peoples.

The aid programs we have carried out, along with all the good they have done, have led to much oversensitiveness and to many unhealthy reactions. Giving aid is not easy, either for those who give or for those who receive.

These difficulties are frequently exaggerated, but we would be foolish to underrate their importance. They involve some serious dangers. If we wish to proceed successfully with our policy for peace, we must meet this present phase of the Communist challenge as we have met others in the past. We must make a real effort to overcome the things that tend to divide us from our friends and allies.

Moving Forward to a Better, Safer World

If this is done—if we are able to preserve unity and confidence among the free nations—we need not be panicky today about the state of the world. We are not on the losing side. The world is not about to collapse around us.

We have a clear and consistent policy for peace. It is not a perfect one. No course of action ever is. It needs constant improvement and revision. But it has proved basically a sound and rugged policy, in line with the feelings of our people and the requirements of the situation.

Future historians may recognize some mistakes. But on balance, I believe they will say that never in history did a great nation respond so effectively and promptly to new and unaccustomed problems as did this Nation in the past 7 years; and never was a greater or more enlightened effort expended for a nobler purpose—the aim of world peace.

One of our greatest dangers today is the danger

of impatience. It is the danger that we will sell ourselves short—that we will underrate our own accomplishments. It is the danger that we will break away from the best path, just because it is long and stony and because there are times when we cannot see over the top of the hill. It is the danger that we will take hasty or erratic action, and thereby sacrifice the very real and impressive achievements already in our hands.

What we need in this coming period is faith in ourselves, courage to do the difficult and distasteful things, consideration and forbearance for our allies, without whose confidence and help our purposes will not be accomplished.

To guide us on this path will soon be the responsibility of new people. No statesmen have ever had a heavier responsibility than these men will have. Let us see that they are given the type of support they need to do their work. Let us tell them frankly when we think they are wrong. But let us support them wholeheartedly when they are right. Let us work with them for peace and freedom in the world and for progress and security for our country.

If we do these things, I am sure we can continue to move forward, with God's help, to a better and safer world.

Administration of Tinian and Saipan

Executive Order 10408¹

WHEREAS the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (hereinafter referred to as the trust territory) was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by Executive Order No. 10265 of June 29, 1951,² and

WHEREAS the purposes of the trusteeship agreement approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 1947, and by the United States Government on July 18, 1947, can better be effectuated by placing in the Secretary of the Navy the authority and responsibility for the administration of that portion of the trust territory which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The administration of that portion of the trust territory which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan is hereby transferred from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy, such transfer to become effective on January 1, 1953.

2. When the transfer of administration made by this order becomes effective, the Secretary of the Navy shall take such action as may be necessary and appropriate, and in harmony with applicable law, for the administration of civil government in that portion of the trust territory which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan and shall, subject to such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe and, when appropriate, in collaboration with other departments or agencies of the Government, carry out the obligations assumed by the United States as the administering authority of the trust territory under the terms of the trusteeship agreement approved by the United States on July 18, 1947, and under the Charter of the United Nations: *Provided*,

¹ 17 Fed. Reg. 10277.

² BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 106.

however, That the authority to specify parts or all of either of such islands as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by the President: And provided further, That the Secretary of the Navy shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed of activities on such islands affecting the foreign policy of the United States and shall consult the Secretary of State on questions of policy concerning such islands which relate to the foreign policy of the United States, and that all relations between departments or agencies of the Government and appropriate organs of the United Nations with respect to such islands shall be conducted through the Secretary of State.

3. The executive departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Departments of the Navy and Interior in the effectuation of the provisions of this order.

4. To the extent that they pertain to the islands of Tinian and Saipan, the provisions of Executive Order No. 10265 of June 29, 1951, shall be superseded by the provisions of this order as of the date set out in the paragraph numbered 1, above.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 10, 1952.

Review of Progress in Latin America

Following is the text of a year-end statement by C. O. Rowe, Acting President of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs of the Technical Cooperation Administration:

Nineteen hundred and fifty-two marked a decade of technical cooperation between the Latin American Republics and the United States, represented by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. It also opened a broader concept of cooperative technical assistance designed to encompass new fields of activity which will make a contribution to economic development. Looking beyond traditional programs of health and sanitation, food supply, and education, the cooperative program aims toward developing assistance to industry, labor, and public administration; the provision of technical and scientific services; the development of natural resources; and the improvement of social welfare and housing.

This cooperative program is becoming more and more a matter of pride with the American Republics. It has been an inspiration to many other areas where similar programs are under way.

Training of Latin American nationals continues to be one of the most important responsibilities of each of the cooperative programs. Over 850 technicians have been provided with opportunities for advanced technical training in the United States during 1952. One important device of training in the United States is the development of special courses designed for specific training groups. A group of 25 rural teachers from three Republics has recently completed a 10-month course under a contract with the University of Maryland. Another group of 12 from an Ameri-

can Republic is being trained at the University of Texas to assume its duties as the core of the teaching staff of an important normal school.

Local training is provided to Latin American nationals through seminars and workshops, demonstration projects, adult-education courses, on-the-job training within industry, summer schools, normal-school training of teachers, and day-by-day association with their U.S. colleagues working in the jointly financed programs.

During 1952, the participating governments have expanded considerably the activities of these jointly financed programs, most of which are of the *Servicio* type. Today there is a total of 43 jointly financed programs in operation: 17 in the field of health and sanitation, 14 in agriculture and the development of natural resources, 10 in education, and 2 which provide assistance to industry and government services. Approximately 620 U.S. technicians are participating in the activities of these programs, working with over 15,000 Latin American nationals.

The key to the success in carrying out a plan for economic development—and there have been many plans proposed in the past—is the reservoir of available Latin American technicians who are trained to do their jobs. After 10 years of progress, competent Latin American technicians are becoming increasingly available to carry through programs successfully. Consequently, international lending agencies are approving loans to Latin American Governments for agricultural and industrial development. They are making these loans on the basis of known available technical knowledge and manpower, recognizing that the resulting improvement in economic conditions will serve to safeguard the loans. Loans cover purchases of many kinds of capital equipment. Joint economic-development commissions have been utilized to develop investment programs and to complete those surveys which are needed to substantiate applications for loans. In countries where these joint commissions have been established, projects have been planned for the development and improvement of railways, highways, ports and harbors, shipping facilities, municipal water-supply and sewer systems, agricultural equipment, irrigation and hydroelectric power, warehousing, and industry. A number of loan applications have been approved and others are under consideration by international lending agencies.

The successes of the technical-cooperation programs have not been easily achieved. They have been possible only because of the cooperative spirit and the constructive thought and labor on the part of the Latin American countries and their technicians. The United States shares with its Latin American neighbors the firm belief that great strides have been made and will continue to be made toward the mutual strengthening of the economic and human resources in the hemisphere.

Witnessing the Birth of a New Europe

by Myron M. Cowen

Ambassador to Belgium¹

Today while we are lunching here, there are two meetings taking place in Europe that are illustrative of the world in which we live. In Vienna, the Communist Party has sponsored another of its quite numerous international peace conferences and, in Paris, the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is meeting.

It is sometimes difficult for us who are not Communists and who do not live behind the Iron Curtain to follow the logic of the propaganda of the U.S.S.R. The meeting in Vienna can hardly be seriously intended to bring about peace. New York, where the United Nations has been meeting, or Korea, where the truce negotiations have been going on for over one year, would seem to be more appropriate places to discuss peace. The choice of the city of Vienna for this week's meeting does not make sense to us. The Western Nations have spent close to 8 years trying to bring about a peace treaty with Austria so that that unfortunate country could once again be united. At literally hundreds of meetings it has been the U.S.S.R., and only the U.S.S.R., that has prevented the making of a peace treaty with Austria. The Austrian people who have been allowed to vote in the Western zone have shown an overwhelming lack of appreciation of the Russian occupation. Some 95 percent of them have voted against communism. They have not had the privilege of seeing the peace that is being talked about in Vienna this week.

Likewise, the timing of the so-called peace meeting in Vienna appears unfortunate to those of us who live in a free world. It follows by such a few days the U.S.S.R.'s outright rejection of the Indian effort to find a solution to the war in Korea.

If, as I suggest, we who are allowed to use our own minds find little logic in the words of the Communists in Vienna that contrast so shockingly in the actions of the Communist world, it would still be a tragic mistake for us to ignore this meeting. We once took Nazi Germany too lightly. We thought that the lies spoken by its leaders

completely, wholly discredited them. We should not now ignore this meeting in Vienna. Today from the loudspeaker of communism comes the automatic repetition, "peace, peace, peace;" while at the same time from the U.S.S.R. spokesmen in Korea and at the United Nations comes, "no, no, no," to each constructive effort to bring about peace.

To us, this inconsistency does not make sense, and we would reject those who say "yes" and "no" at the same time. But not all of the world reads well-reported and accurate stories of the sessions of the United Nations and of the truce negotiations in Korea. Some of the world will only see the artificial peace doves of Vienna and hear the loudspeakers saying, "peace, peace, peace." And even in our own countries there will be some who are tired and confused, to whom the loud reiteration of the word *peace* will be easier to follow than the twisted course of obstruction and aggression that has kept the world from peace in these recent years.

It is because the nations of the free world have so painfully learned in the last 7 years that the same men who sponsor meetings for peace in Vienna can be responsible for intimidation, aggression, and war in other places that we have today regional security pacts in the Americas, in the Pacific, and among the nations of the North Atlantic community. The meeting that is being held today in Paris of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is for the very purpose of measuring our defenses against the sponsors of the peace conference in Vienna.

We know too painfully well the policies and actions against which these defensive pacts were built—Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Korea, the darkness that shrouds Central Europe and China, the continuous veto in the United Nations, the sabotage and obstruction of the Communist Parties within our own borders, the civil war that still flickers in the Philippines and which is a roaring fire at this moment in Indochina.

As the free nations took stock of the postwar world, what did they find? They found that the

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Belgio-American Association at Charleroi, Belgium, on Dec. 19.

world
the In
Curtai
pire in
its sa
of son
not d
own f
new f
was c
pacity
tions
peace
tensio
to int
nist p
free m

The
of the
strugg
had to

1. I
2. I
3. I
4. I

from
drawn

Futur

To
centr
comm
met:
What

As
consi
throu
to kee
reflec
the U
nent.
morta
paper
time
tions

The
come
migh
which

I h
contr
ing f
one o
probl
in or
probl

An
tion
in the
tial p
Be

Janu

world had been sharply divided into two parts by the Iron Curtain. On the other side of the Iron Curtain the U. S. S. R. controlled the largest empire in the history of the world. The U. S. S. R., its satellites, and China comprised a population of some 750,000,000 people. The U. S. S. R. had not disarmed after the war. It had kept up its own forces and had taken energetic steps to build new forces in the satellite states and China. It was devoting its resources to increasing its capacity for making war. In addition, the free nations found that the U. S. S. R. did not want a peaceful solution of the causes of international tensions. Or it would tolerate only such solutions to international problems that increased Communist power and weakened the independence of the free nations.

These were the conditions, these were the facts of the world in which the free nations faced their struggle for survival. Immediately these nations had to:

1. Rearm.
2. Rebuild.
3. Re-create viable or workable economies.
4. Refill the vacuums in those areas of the world from which power and authority had been withdrawn.

Future of the North Atlantic Community

Today, because of the limits of time, let us concentrate our consideration on the North Atlantic community and see how the problems have been met: Have the steps taken been satisfactory? What of the future?

As you know, these questions which we are now considering are being intensively discussed throughout the free world. I make a serious effort to keep myself informed of this discussion as it is reflected in three groups of newspapers, those of the United States, Great Britain, and the Continent. Please do not misunderstand me. No mortal man could adequately follow all of these papers, but it is possible by looking at them from time to time to be familiar with their major reactions to this discussion.

The reason I mention this to you is that I have come to a conclusion about this discussion that might be somewhat of an oversimplification but which I believe is essentially true.

I have come to believe that there are two sharply contrasted types of men who are engaged in looking for answers to our questions. The man of one of these types starts his examination of the problem by saying, "What is it that we must have in order to reach a satisfactory answer to our problem?"

And the other type of man starts his examination of these problems by saying, "Are we going in the right direction, and are we making substantial progress?"

Before I go further with our discussion, I must

reveal to you that I find myself in this last classification, and my answers will therefore have some bias. I think that we may start our discussion with some positive signs of progress.

First, in the years immediately after the war Europe was faced with serious economic collapse; this has been avoided. Today's industrial output in Western Europe is approximately 40 percent larger than in 1948 and 60 percent larger than in 1947. Agricultural production has improved. Trade between European nations, which had practically stopped in 1947, has now increased until it is one-third more than it was in prewar years.

Second, this economic improvement has been made while the countries of Western Europe have been engaged in a large rearmament program. This improvement has not been made by cutting consumption, which is today at prewar levels. Defense burdens today are higher than they were in 1938.

Third, European military forces have consistently improved. Today, a potential aggressor would know that Europe's military forces, with American assistance, would meet his force with force.

Fourth, the political health of Western Europe has improved greatly and is continuing to improve. Communist strength in European governments has constantly declined.

However, as important as these factors are, much more important are the many manifestations of Europe's ancient political genius. No one can have observed Europe since 1947 without being struck by the manifestation of political talent, imagination, skill, and vitality.

It has been said that the free world today faces the problem of unity in freedom or unity in slavery. This statement seemed particularly pertinent to the Europe of 1947. Since that time, under the most difficult circumstances Europe has made almost unbelievable steps toward integration. Perhaps the peril that faced Europe has been impetus for the progress Europe has made. Certainly, there has been stimulation for the evolution and development of new political institutions from both sides of the Atlantic. Undoubtedly, the economic and military assistance programs of the United States have made a very substantial contribution to this progress. But it is equally true that no matter what the magnitude of these programs might have been, they could not have been superimposed on a community that lacked political talent, capacity, vitality, and a will to succeed.

It is impossible now to trace the growth of the many new political institutions which have developed in Europe since 1947, but I would like to recall a few of the major developments. The first step toward European economic union grew out of U.S. assistance under the Marshall Plan. It was the establishment by 16 countries of Western Europe of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Its primary respon-

sibility was to insure the effective use of American aid. Among its first responsibilities was the task of recommending the distribution of Marshall Plan funds among the European countries who participated in the plan. It was in this committee that many of the most competent experts in Europe worked together as members of the European community, rather than as citizens of one country.

The OEEC created the European Payments Union (EPU) as a clearinghouse for intra-European payments. The creation of EPU, as it is called, was a first step toward the creation by Western Europe of one large and competitive market where goods and currencies could move freely.

In 1948 the Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to create a collective-defense system that would be capable of protecting the security of the Western European nations.

However, the Brussels treaty went much further than an agreement of the signatories to come to each other's aid in the case of an armed attack. The countries that signed the treaty agreed to organize and coordinate their economic policies and activities. They agreed to develop social services and to promote cultural exchanges.

The present North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) grew out of the Brussels treaty. The primary objective of NATO has been to build "an integrated military force adequate to defend Europe." This force is intended to be more than a paper force to come into being at a time of emergency. It is intended to be a force in existence in peacetime.

One of the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for collective action in political, economic, and social fields. Every day there are countless decisions made and actions taken under NATO that represent European integration. Many of the decisions of NATO are political and economic in character—for an example, "The Annual Review" that is made of each country's contribution in relation to that country's economic capability.

European integration has already been developed more intensively in yet another organization, the Coal and Steel Community. Six European Governments—Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany—have pooled their coal and steel industries into single production and marketing areas.

These same six countries have agreed to merge their national armed forces into a single European defense force. In the near future, the legislative bodies of all of these countries should have this agreement before them for ratification.

The European Coal and Steel Community is an established, functioning institution. When, in addition to that, the European Defense Community comes into being, a strong and united Europe will lie a very short distance in the future.

I told you that I looked at the recent years of European history with a prejudice. My prejudice, my preference, is to measure these years by what has been accomplished rather than measuring them by what has not been accomplished. These have been great achievements. They are visible evidences of the talent and vitality of the new Europe.

Hopes Held by the Men in the Kremlin

However, no matter how great these achievements are, we must consider the other point of view that asks whether there is in Europe today a force which could successfully defend Europe against a Soviet attack. What progress has Europe made toward the restoration of its capacity for self-defense? To both of these questions, the answers would be negative. Europe has not a force in being comparable to Soviet forces that we know exist, and Europe still has tremendous steps to take before it can reestablish its capacity for self-defense.

From the great outpouring of speeches and printed material at the recent Moscow Conference, it would appear that the men in the Kremlin wish time to build up the productive capacity of their unparalleled empire. They have made it clear that they believe that their system can endure a long Cold War better than the free nations. They have made it clear that they believe that the free nations cannot work out their economic problems without conflicts, that the free nations will not be able to maintain the unity they have been developing. These views will bear our close attention. The men in the Kremlin will take every opportunity that is presented them to separate the free nations and undo the unity that has been achieved.

In addition, the free world can never be sure that the men in the Kremlin will not decide to attack. At any moment they may decide that it will profit them to attack and attempt to destroy the growing strength of the free nations.

These are dangers that we must face immediately. They are dangers that we must live with. They constitute a risk which we cannot ignore.

I have said several times that I am impressed by the accomplishments that have been made. I think that we in our day are witnessing the birth of a new Europe. I believe this new Europe has the capacity and the fortitude to achieve heights that will surpass even its ancient greatness. There are dreadful problems before it, economic problems, social problems, and political problems. All of these have to be solved in order to solve the military problem. I believe that the new Europe has a momentum that is just now getting under way. I believe this momentum is sweeping the old defeatism away. I believe it is gaining the power to reestablish the new Europe—"mistress as of yore . . . of the hearts of men."

Soviets Say "Wrong Address" in Reply to U.S. Notes on Hungarian Plane Incident

Elim O'Shaughnessy, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States at Moscow, on December 17 transmitted a note to Jacob Malik, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the liability of the Soviet Government arising from the seizure and detention of the U.S. C-47 airplane 6026 and its crew in Hungary on November 19, 1951.

An earlier U.S. note on the subject had been delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office on December 10, 1952.¹ On December 11, 1952, the Soviet Government returned to the American Embassy in Moscow the U.S. note of December 10, on the ground that the note was "incorrectly addressed," implying that it should have been addressed to the Hungarian Government.

Following receipt of Mr. O'Shaughnessy's December 17 communication, the Soviet Government, in a note dated December 20, returned the U.S. note for the second time. Printed here are the texts of (1) the Soviet reply to the original U.S. note of December 10; (2) the U.S. communication of December 17 transmitting the December 10 note under new cover; and (3) the second Soviet reply.

Soviet Note of December 11

MOSCOW, December 11, 1952.

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM.

There is returned herewith your note No. 473 of December 10, 1952, as incorrectly addressed, since it refers to the question of the American military transport airplane C-47 which in November 1951 violated the frontier of the Hungarian Peoples Republic and was confiscated by the Hungarian authorities together with objects in it in accordance with the judgment of the Budapest Military Tribunal.

Yours respectfully,

Y. A. MALIK

To Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R., Moscow

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, p. 981.

U. S. Note of December 17

Press release 923 dated December 17

The Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Acting Minister's note dated December 11, 1952, returning to the Embassy the United States note of December 10 concerning the airplane incident in Hungary on November 19, 1951, on the ground that the note was incorrectly addressed.

The Soviet Government is well aware that the United States Government has communicated separately with the Hungarian Government in this matter.² The United States note of December 10 to the Soviet Government refers clearly to instrumentalities of the Soviet Government which were involved in the detention of the United States plane and crew and concerns actions, material, and information which only the Soviet Government can explain or provide. Thus the United States note to the Soviet Government is not incorrectly addressed, but the Soviet Government has apparently failed to take proper notice of its full contents. Specifically, the attention of the Soviet Government is called to numbered paragraph 2 of the United States note, which requests identification of certain items with regard to Mr. Vishinsky's speeches before the United Nations General Assembly in Paris; to paragraph 3 requesting copies of statements and investigation reports in the Soviet Government's files; and to paragraph 4 which concerns provisions of treaties, agreements and arrangements between the Soviet and Hungarian Governments.

As regards the statement made in the Acting Foreign Minister's note that the United States aircraft was confiscated by the Hungarian authorities in accordance with the judgment of the Budapest Military Tribunal, it may be pointed out that that statement does not establish defi-

² *Ibid.*, p. 982.

nately whether the Soviet Government turned over to the Hungarian Government the airplane and its contents and, if so, on what date and under what circumstances the transfer occurred. Moreover, the Soviet note does not make clear whether the Soviet Government is claiming that the decree of confiscation by the Hungarian military court relieves the Soviet Government from liability to the United States Government for failure to return the airplane and its contents or their value.

In the absence of a specific reply on these points, the United States Government will assume that the United States property in question was voluntarily turned over to Hungarian authorities by the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government is informed that the action of turning over the described property to the Hungarian authorities and the action of the Hungarian authorities in purporting to confiscate the property in no way relieve the Soviet Government from liability to the United States; and further that any steps which the United States may take directed to obtaining a return of the property in question, or their value, from the Hungarian Government will in no way constitute condonation by the United States of the illegality of the Soviet Government's action or relieve it from liability to the United States.

The Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* therefore is again transmitting the original United States note and requests the Acting Minister for Foreign Af-

fairs that due consideration be given to the note and an appropriate reply be transmitted as requested.

Soviet Reply of December 20

No. 50/U.S.

In connection with the note of the Embassy of the United States of America No. 495 of December 17, 1952, with which the Embassy again forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. the note of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. of December 10, 1952, the Ministry states the following.

Inasmuch as the Embassy's note of December 17, 1952 touches upon the same question as the note of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in the U.S.S.R. of December 10, 1952, which was returned to the Embassy for reasons set forth in the letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Y. A. Malik, of December 11, 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not see any reason for new consideration of this question and returns herewith the Embassy's note of December 17 and the Embassy's note of December 10 which was attached to it.

Moscow, December 20, 1952.

To the Embassy of the United States of America,
Moscow

U.S. Position on ICRC's Proposals Relative to Kojedo Incident

Press release 929 dated December 22

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) released last week at Geneva a collection of correspondence in two volumes, called the "Korean Conflict," covering the period from January 1 to June 30, 1952.

News stories based on the ICRC release of correspondence referred to a committee letter dated May 12, 1952, and to a letter from Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces. The letter from General Clark was dated June 12, 1952, and was in fact a reply to a letter of May 24, 1952, from the ICRC.

The ICRC correspondence of May 12 was in the form of an aide-memoire to the American Consul at Geneva. This aide-memoire of May 12 was answered by the American Consul on July 28. The Consul's reply did not appear in the collec-

tion of correspondence released by the ICRC last week. Following are the texts of the ICRC's aide-memoire and the reply of the American Consul:

ICRC'S AIDE-MÉMOIRE OF MAY 12

The attention of the International Committee of the Red Cross has recently been drawn by its Delegation for Korea to the dangerous situation prevailing in the United Nations POW Camp No. 1 at Kojedo, and, in addition to the events of 18 February 1952, to the grave occurrences in this camp on 13 March and 10 April 1952.

On 13 March a group of soldiers of the Republic of Korea and a group of Korean prisoners of war from Compound 93, who were under guard by South Korean soldiers, passed alongside Compound 92 (which was also a Compound of Korean

prisoners of war). The prisoners of war of the two Compounds 92 and 93 are stated under these circumstances to have begun throwing stones at one another on grounds of differences of political opinions. Certain South Korean soldiers are said to have been hit by these missiles, on which they opened fire, and killed 12 prisoners of war and wounded 26.

On 10 April in the matter of a wounded prisoner in Compound 95, whom his comrades refused to permit to be moved to the hospital, orders were issued to move the man. Unarmed military personnel of the Republic of Korea entered the Compound for the purpose, but did not take the formation they were directed to take. Trouble followed, in the course of which the American troops opened fire, in which ROK soldiers joined. As a result there were wounded and dead amongst the prisoners of war and the guards.

In the dual circumstances it appears that the firing constitutes a violation of Article 42 of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

The Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation for Korea thought it necessary to inform General Ridgway personally on 25 March as to the position, and in particular as to the events of 13 March above stated, and to make certain proposals to him with a view to improving the position. The proposals in question were for:

1. Withdrawal of the South Korean guards of Koje-do Camp, their employment as guards of their compatriots constituting a continual risk of incidents.
2. Avoidance of political demonstrations of any kind, and in particular of the continuance of the political programme of the C. I. E.¹ for the education of prisoners of war. Political questions do not in general concern the International Committee of the Red Cross; but it thought it should raise the present issue in view of its humanitarian aspects, political activities being a constant source of incidents.
3. Distribution of the enormous Koje-do Camp amongst smaller camps, which would be more easily controlled.

General Ridgway agreed in principle with these three proposals. He gave immediate orders with regard to the second proposal. He said he would endeavour to find means of acting on the first proposal. The third proposal was, he said, a matter which exceeded his powers, but he would support the proposal, should occasion arise. The International Committee of the Red Cross has since learnt that steps have been taken on the subject of this last proposal.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is anxious in the first place to say how much it appreciates the facilities which have been given to it to enable it to fulfil its tasks in connection with

the prisoners of war. It also appreciates the understanding displayed by the highest Military authorities in relation to the Head of the International Committee's delegation.

In submitting the above to the competent authorities, the International Committee of the Red Cross is expressing the hope that the proposals put forward by its delegate will be taken into consideration. Their application would most likely avoid the repetition of serious incidents, and in general promote relaxation of a dangerous tension.

CONSUL GENERAL'S REPLY OF JULY 28

The Consul General of the United States of America has the honor again to refer to the Aide-Mémoire of the International Committee of the Red Cross dated May 12, 1952. This document concerned the situation then prevailing at the United Nations Prisoner of War Camp No. 1 at Koje-do in South Korea.

The Consul General has been instructed to reply to the Committee's Aide-Mémoire as follows:

1. It is believed that the following facts more completely describe the incident of April 10, 1952, at Camp No. 1:

(a) On April 10, 1952, the Communist prisoners once again challenged camp authorities. This incident began with a violent Communist demonstration inside the barrier of Compound 95 of Enclosure Number 9. The several compounds of this enclosure containing North Korean Army enlisted men had been involved in virulent Communist agitation, beatings, and intimidations of non-Communists since mid-September, but never before had the leaders or the group as a whole openly challenged camp authority. In the efforts to restore order one prisoner of war was wounded. A United States Army Captain and two United States soldiers, all unarmed, immediately entered the compound dispensary, just within the compound gates, to remove the wounded man to the hospital. They were forced to withdraw by the swarming Communists.

(b) Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, then Camp Commandant, promptly ordered that the Communist leaders in the compound permit the evacuation of the wounded Communist. When they refused, General Dodd ordered 100 unarmed Republic of Korea guards into the enclosure to bring out the casualty. The guards were promptly set upon with clubs and stones; one guard was seized by the Communists and disappeared in the rioting mass. The armed guards outside the perimeter, in an attempt to protect the unarmed Republic of Korea soldiers, fired into the enclosure, wounding, among others, a United States Army officer and some Republic of Korea guard personnel.

(c) At this point, the Communists staged a mass rush on the open gates. This attack was

¹ Civil Information and Education.

stopped by the prompt and determined action of an American officer and two American soldiers manning a jeep-mounted .30 caliber machine gun which was covering the gate to prevent any mass escape. As a result of this disturbance, precipitated and continued by the prisoners, three Communists were killed and fifty-seven wounded; four Republic of Korea Army guards were killed, six wounded; and one American officer was slightly wounded.

2. With regard to the three proposals made by the International Committee of the Red Cross to General Ridgway, the following information presents certain developments since the proposals were made, as well as certain facts not mentioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross, pertinent to the subject.

(a) Withdrawal of South Korean guards: A large number of UN (other than Republic of Korea) guards are now on Koje-do; however, the magnitude of the job directs some utilization of South Korea guards.

(b) Education of prisoners of war: The CI&E program consists of an orientation program during which prisoners of war, on a voluntary basis, attend lectures on the history of Korea and China; Korea under the American occupation; the aims, structure, functions and accomplishments of the United Nations; the principles, ideals and practices of democracy as contrasted to those of totalitarianism. Following the orientation program, prisoners of war are assisted in developing vocational skills which will enable them to participate in the future rebuilding of their countries while at the same time to improve their living conditions in the camps where they are held as prisoners of war. This phase was removed from the program early in April, 1952; the entire CI&E program was discontinued late in April, 1952, because of the screening operations and the subsequent transfer of prisoners of war to other compounds. A complete CI&E program, including the "orientation course", is currently in progress at all installations housing prisoners of war who have refused to return to Communist control. In these installations, the program is being well received by the prisoners. Camp authorities especially desire the CI&E program as a means of providing constructive use of the time of the prisoners, which contributes to good order and discipline.

(c) Distribution of prisoners of war: It is believed that this has been satisfactorily arranged. By June 22, 1952, eighty-one thousand prisoners of war had been moved to more manageable 500-man compounds.

3. It is believed that appropriate action has been taken on the International Committee of the Red Cross proposals to avoid repetition of serious incidents and to relax tension in the compounds.

Loan for Expansion of Iron and Steel Production in India

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on December 19 announced a loan of 31.5 million dollars for a major expansion of iron and steel production in India. The borrower is the Indian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. (IISCO), a privately owned Indian company whose works are situated in West Bengal. The loan is for a term of 15 years and is guaranteed by the Government of India.

The loan will help the company carry out a 5-year project for increasing its blast-furnace capacity from 640,000 tons to 1,400,000 tons of iron a year and for raising finished steel capacity from 350,000 to 700,000 tons annually. When completed, the company's program will double the quantity of foundry iron now available from domestic sources in India and will increase the country's present output of finished steel by about one-third.

India is now in the second year of a 5-year plan for economic development. Greater supplies of iron and steel are essential to the continued progress of the plan. Large amounts of both will be required for the increased production of food, a pressing need of the Indian economy. Iron is required for the manufacture of plows and other farm equipment. Steel is needed for the construction of large irrigation and flood-control works designed to increase agricultural output, for extension of railroads and roads, for hydroelectric works to furnish power to industry and rural areas, and for new housing. The demand for steel is already considerably larger than can be met by Indian producers, and substantial amounts of foreign exchange are spent each year for steel imports.

India is in a particularly good position to produce her own steel. Her steel companies are low-cost producers. The country has rich deposits of the basic materials needed—iron ore, coal, manganese, and limestone—and labor is plentiful. IISCO's works, west of Calcutta in the Burnpur area of the Damodar Valley, are situated conveniently close both to basic raw materials and to the principal markets for steel in India.

The present loan grows out of recommendations made by an International Bank mission headed by George Woods, chairman of the First Boston Corporation. The mission concluded that the Bank could most quickly help India achieve important gains in production by helping to finance new facilities at the works of IISCO and of the Steel Corporation of Bengal, Ltd. (SCOB).

SCOB and IISCO are separate companies but are to be merged as of January 1, 1953, under legislation introduced in the current session of the Indian Parliament. The assets and liabilities of SCOB will be transferred to IISCO, and SCOB will cease to

exist. The plants of the two companies are under the same management, and their works at Burnpur already are physically integrated.

The program for which the Bank's loan is being used consists of the expansion of the integrated facilities at Burnpur, the modernization of IISCO's iron plant at Kulti, a few miles from Burnpur, and the expansion and mechanization of IISCO's operations at its iron mines at Gua. At Burnpur, two new batteries of 78 coke ovens each will be installed and an obsolete 40-oven battery will be removed; two new blast furnaces, each with a daily output of 1,200 tons of iron, will be installed. Steel-making facilities will be increased by the addition of a third 25-ton Bessemer converter. The finishing departments in the rolling mills will be expanded for additional tonnage. At IISCO's Kulti works, which make iron for foundries, the blast furnaces will be modernized and equipment will be installed to lower production costs.

The total cost of this program is estimated at approximately 73.5 million dollars. More than half of the cost will be met out of IISCO's revenues and by loans and advances from the Indian Government; the Bank's loan will be used to pay for imported equipment and services.

While the Bank in the past has lent funds for private manufacturing enterprises, it has done so by making loans to intermediary borrowers, such as central or development banks, who have re-lent the proceeds to these enterprises. The IISCO loan is the first the Bank has made directly to a manufacturer. The interest rate is 4¾ percent including the 1 percent commission which, in accordance with the Bank's articles of agreement, is allocated to a special reserve. Amortization payments will begin on April 15, 1959, and are calculated to pay off the loan on October 15, 1967.

This is the Bank's fourth loan in India. The others are 31.2 million dollars for the rehabilitation of the Indian railways; 18.5 million dollars for the development of power and irrigation in the Damodar Valley; and 7.5 million dollars for land clearance in central India. The first project has been completed; the others are still being carried out.

Point Four Agreement for Indian Malaria Control

Press release 933 dated December 30

A malaria-control program designed to provide protection for approximately 75 million people in India by March 1954 has been agreed upon between the Government of that country and the Technical Cooperation Administration, it was announced on December 30. The program provides for a contribution by the United States of 5,200,000 dollars of Point Four funds for the first

year's operation and of 14,900,000 rupees (the equivalent of 3,129,000 dollars) by India for the same period.

During the last fiscal year the United States contributed 648 thousand dollars of Point Four funds to the Indian malaria-control program. These funds were used for the purchase of DDT and resochin tablets.

India has included the control of malaria in its over-all 5-year development plan. Point Four will supply some 4,000 long tons of 75 percent wettable DDT, 2,250 Hudson sprayers, 4,500 stirrup pumps, 75 motor-driven spraying units, 75 microscopes, 300 trucks, 75 jeeps, and 9 station wagons for the operation of the program. The cost of these items, all to be purchased in the United States, is estimated at 5,200,000 dollars. The Indian contribution is to be used in defraying local costs, materials, and services.

For more than a century, malaria has been recognized as the most formidable health problem in India. The Government already has taken measures to combat it and its program today is calculated to bring benefits to some 30 million people. The best available statistics indicate an annual occurrence of 100 million cases with one million deaths directly attributable to the disease and another million in which malaria is an indirect factor.

There are no direct figures on the personal monetary losses the disease has been causing, but the World Health Organization found that since the beginning of its malaria program in Terai, United Provinces, there has been a 36 percent increase in land under cultivation, an equal percentage of increase in grain-food production, more than 100 percent increase in production of grain and edible oils and in industrial undertakings. There was a 75 percent increase in population due to resettlement of Pakistani refugees who returned to the territory after it was made safe.

The organization for the malaria-control program rests with the Malaria Institute of India and the state governments. Nine of the states have programs in operation; eight others have limited organizations. They are assisted with funds and technical advisers by the Central Government.

The proposed nation-wide program which provides for continuous operation is divided into a 3-year accelerated program, financed in part by the Indo-American Fund to bring malaria speedily under control, and a state-controlled program financed by the states with or without funds from the Central Government. The over-all control will rest with the Ministry of Health of India, with state, private, and governmental-agency participation.

The international, bilateral, and selected governmental agencies will serve as an advisory committee to the Ministry of Health with respect to the malaria-control program and its operation. They will also provide expert technical consulta-

tion or assistance as requested by the Ministry of Health of India or by the states. Constant evaluation of the program will be made to insure its efficient operation.

The Indian 5-year plan also includes the construction of a DDT plant (programed for 1954-55) to supplement the output of the DDT plant programed by the Government of India with the assistance of the World Health Organization. The plant is scheduled to be put into operation during the spring of 1954, with an output of 750 tons of DDT.

The Indo-American cooperative program is for 3 years. During that time the Indo-American Fund will be used to provide financial assistance to the states through grants of DDT and essential new equipment. State governments and the Central Government will provide the rupee costs for operations in an amount at least equal to the DDT costs. At the end of the 3-year period the Central and state governments will provide all funds for the continuation of the program. It is planned to establish and operate 200 malaria-control units. Each unit will benefit about one million population and will utilize from 30 to 40 tons of DDT. It will consist of a malaria-control officer, four senior malaria-control inspectors, four malaria inspectors, an accountant, three clerks, five van drivers, 13 field workers (full time), 130 part-time field workers, and 6 other persons for watchmen, sweepers, and peons.

It is planned to get 75 of these units into operation during 1953-54. An additional 50 will be added the next year and a final 75, to bring the total to 200, during the third year of the program.

The World Health Organization and Rockefeller Foundation have collaborated in India's malaria-control program and the latter still provides consultation on request, overseas training for malariologists and contributions to the support of operations in malaria control in Mysore State.

During the entire period of the program, special attention will be given to training Indian technicians to continue the operations when the original 3-year plan is completed. The medical officers and malaria inspectors will receive their training at the Malaria Institute and the spraying crews will get their training in the field.

Point Four in Saudi Arabia

Press release 2 dated January 2

Dr. Samuel S. Stratton, U.S. director of Technical Cooperation in Saudi Arabia, having concluded his assignment, left his post on December 19, 1952, to return to the United States.

John A. Dunaway, chief of the Government Services and Public Administration Division of the TCA staff in Saudi Arabia, will be acting director of technical cooperation until a successor to Dr. Stratton is named. Mr. Dunaway, a specialist in customs and tariff matters with long experience in the international field, has had service with various international commissions in the Near East and a period of service as financial adviser to the Government of Liberia. He is presently engaged in helping the Government of Saudi Arabia revise and modernize its entire tariff and customs system, as part of a broader undertaking for systematizing the entire fiscal and monetary structure of the Government.

During Dr. Stratton's year in Saudi Arabia, a monetary agency has been established; a system of Government control over expenditures and receipts has been inaugurated; a new currency has been adopted; ground-water surveying and waterwell construction has continued and expanded; plans have been completed for surveys of the Riyadh-Jidda railway route, preliminary to award of contracts for construction; the nation's first commercial school has been started; and preliminary work has been completed on a cooperative community-development program, which will be a large-scale effort by the Saudi Arabian Government to improve the economic and social conditions of villagers. Activities in health, sanitation, education, and agriculture are expected to get under way shortly.

Letter of Credence

Syria

The newly appointed Ambassador of Syria, Farid Zeineddine, presented his credentials to the President on December 18. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 925 of December 18.

American Citizens in the U.N. Secretariat

LETTER FROM SECRETARY ACHESON TO REPRESENTATIVE FRANK L. CHELF¹

Press release 932 dated December 30

DECEMBER 30, 1952

MY DEAR MR. CHELF:

In the course of testimony before the Subcommittee of which you are Chairman, an official of the Department of State has discussed the highly confidential arrangements whereby the Department of State has identified for the Secretary-General of the United Nations American citizens employed in the United Nations Secretariat, or contemplated for employment therein, whom the Department believed, on the basis of investigation, to be Communists or under Communist discipline.

You have asked that officers of the Department furnish to your Committee the names of the persons in the Department of State who evaluated the information resulting from the investigation of American citizens employed or who were contemplated for employment by the United Nations. Evaluation is not a single act. It is a process involving a series of responsible administrative actions. The official in the Department of State who is responsible, under my supervision, for handling all aspects of United States policy toward the United Nations and all relationships between the United States and the United Nations is Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. On instructions from the President, the Department is unable to supply you with the names of those persons who participated in the evaluating process in connection with American citizens in the employ of the United Nations.

To carry out successfully the foreign policy of the United States, the Department of State requires loyal, objective, fearless, and able performance of duty by operating officials. All tasks assigned to a subordinate official of the Department of State must be carried out in that manner, whether the individual likes the particular task or not. Some tasks are themselves likable and enjoyable while others must be performed regardless of whether the official enjoys them. If the name of a subordinate official who evaluated se-

curity information regarding American employees in the United Nations were to be made public, or, indeed, if the names of those officers who drafted particular political documents regarding our relations with individual foreign countries were to be made public, the successful carrying out of the foreign policy of the United States would be adversely affected, if not seriously compromised. It is apparent, at the outset, that a demand for the names of subordinate officials involved in any particular foreign relations task of the Department of State is, by itself, indicative that the task upon which they have been engaged is a matter of public controversy; if the subject matter itself were not a matter of controversy there would ordinarily be little motivation for any desire to identify subordinate officials connected with it. A practice of making public these names would of necessity be a signal to all subordinate officials of the Department of State to avoid as best they could becoming involved in matters which were controversial, or, if unavoidable, for each to tailor his actions with respect to such a matter to what he conceived to be, at that time, the state of popular feeling or of any articulate portion of the public regarding it, even though he considered that action based upon that feeling or a portion of it to be contrary to the interest of the United States, as his own honest, considered, and trained judgment saw that interest. Not only that, he would be apt to document his precise contribution or attitude—"make a record"—on the controversy against the day when he would have to justify himself "on the record". A foreign service or civil service career official, loyal and trained, who enjoyed his work and wished to continue in it, would without question consider that he would be taking risks which would appear to him to be undue should he act otherwise under those circumstances. A Department of State whose officers avoided working on difficult and controversial matters, or adjusted their own judgments to what they conceived to be popular judgments, or were busily engaged in "making records", could not operate effectively to carry on successfully the foreign relations of the United States.

These considerations have long been recognized in the Department and have resulted in the adoption long ago of the principle of effective responsibility of the top officials of the Department.

¹ Chairman, Special Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary.

These men, the Assistant Secretaries of State or their equivalent in rank, are responsible for the work of all subordinate officials who serve under them. They, and the Secretary of State under whose supervision they work, are responsible for all the work performed by the Department of State. Their subordinates have their confidence or they cease to be subordinates. It is essential in order that the efficiency of the Department as an operating institution be maintained, to preserve this principle. To disclose the names of subordinate officials who have evaluated the security information on an American citizen employed by the United Nations, or who drafted a controversial note to the French, would undermine that principle to the detriment of the Department and the United States.

The arrangements between the United States and the United Nations regarding the identification of American citizens employed by the United Nations who are Communists or under Communist discipline were established on the most highly classified basis in 1949. The names of the evaluating officials in the Department of State who performed functions under this arrangement were classified on the same basis at the same time. While the existence of this arrangement has been made public, this portion of the arrangement has not been and cannot be declassified. It is essential that this be so in order that the integrity of the investigative files themselves can be maintained. For the furnishing of the names of these officials can lead only to questioning of these officials regarding their action—the reasons for their evaluation of particular individuals. Such questions could be answered only upon the basis of information contained in investigative files as recollected by the officer. As a consequence, information contained in investigative files themselves would have been disclosed. As you know, it is the established policy of this Government that security files of individuals must remain confidential in the public interest.

For these reasons, and by direction of the President, the names of the subordinate evaluating officers cannot be furnished.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

**STATEMENT BY JOHN D. HICKERSON
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR U.N. AFFAIRS¹**

Press release 934 dated December 31

I should like to begin by first clarifying certain important points that have arisen in the recent discussions on the subject of the loyalty of Americans on the U.N. Secretariat. Let me summarize

¹ Made before the Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Dec. 31. For text of Mr. Hickerson's statement before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on Dec. 10, see BULLETIN of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1026.

the main points first and then take them up in greater detail later.

1. The Department of State has always felt that Americans who are Communists or under Communist discipline should not be employed by the United Nations and that all appropriate steps should be taken to remove them. This view has been shared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who under the Charter of the United Nations has the responsibility of hiring and firing Secretariat employees.

2. In 1946 Secretary Byrnes established the policy that, with the exception of the appointment of the first Assistant Secretary-General for Administrative and Financial Services, the U.S. Government would not make recommendations for employment on the U.N. Secretariat. That policy has been followed ever since.

3. The Department of State has never undertaken to clear or "give a clean bill of health" to any American employed by the United Nations. The fact that the Department of State did not make adverse comments on Americans on the U.N. Secretariat under a confidential arrangement started in the fall of 1949 did not mean that those individuals were cleared, and this was understood by the Secretary-General. The U.S. Government was not in a position to assume responsibility for the reliability of Americans on the Secretariat on loyalty grounds, and the Secretary-General was so informed.

4. The Department of State could not, without violating security practices of the U.S. Government, make available to the United Nations the information provided it by the FBI and other security agencies which was the basis for the adverse comments sent to the Secretary-General.

5. The Department has not had evidence justifying a conclusion that there was spying or espionage on the part of American citizens employed by the United Nations. If either the Department of State or the Department of Justice had had evidence justifying such a conclusion, prompt action would have been taken under the criminal laws of the United States by the Department of Justice which has responsibility for enforcing these laws.

6. Without in any way minimizing the importance which the Department places on seeing that the employees of the Secretariat are persons of integrity, it should be borne in mind that the security of classified information is not involved in this question. The employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations do not have access to any U. S. security information.

7. Despite the handicaps which the confidential nature of the arrangement with the Secretary-General imposed on it, the arrangement achieved the dismissal of a number of disloyal Americans and prevented the employment of others.

Misconceptions on these points have arisen from the failure to understand the background of the

Department of State Bulletin

confidential arrangement between the U.S. Government and the Secretary-General on subversive Americans on the U.N. Secretariat. The confidential nature of the arrangement created limitations and difficulties.

The U.N. Secretariat is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. It is a staff of international employees charged with servicing the various organs and agencies of the United Nations and of serving the 60 member nations represented in these organs. It was clear when the organization of the United Nations was being planned that this staff had to be set up as an impartial and objective staff, subject to the orders of no member state. The Secretariat was accordingly placed under the authority of the Secretary-General, the chief administrative officer of the organization, and established as an international civil service not subject to instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization. Of course, we realized that some governments might abuse the position of their nationals on the Secretariat. But we believed that the United States should set an example, and we did, in seeking to assure a firm basis for the international character of the Secretariat as the only means of establishing a solid basis of confidence by the member states in the work of the organization.

It is important to look at the precise provisions of the Charter on this subject:

Article 7, paragraph 1 states that "There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat."

Articles 97 through 101 recite the detailed Charter provisions in regard to the composition of the Secretariat. These articles read as follows:

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instruc-

tions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

In effect the Charter, in particular articles 100 and 101, states that hiring and dismissal of U.N. staff members is the sole responsibility of the Secretary-General in accordance with the regulations established by the General Assembly and that the Secretary-General shall not seek or receive instructions from any government in the discharge of this duty as well as his other duties. At the same time, every member state is committed to respect the international character of the Secretary-General's responsibilities and not to seek to influence him. The United States has acted accordingly in its relations with the Secretary-General.

The second factor basically affecting the nature of the confidential arrangement was that before the International Jurists' Report last month³ the Secretary-General had not found it possible to discharge Americans on the stated ground that they were Communists or under Communist discipline. Furthermore, in discharging employees the Secretary-General had to contend with an elaborate appeals procedure, including an Administrative Tribunal, with power to demand a reversal of the Secretary-General's action or damages in lieu thereof. These circumstances made it essential that the Secretary-General protect himself against the charge that he was being unduly influenced by the U.S. Government, in violation of the Charter, when moving against persons identified by the Department as subversive.

At the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, Trygve Lie was elected Secretary-General and, under regulations established by the General Assembly, he proceeded to appoint the Secretariat staff.

Subsequently, in 1946 the Secretary-General discussed with the Department the recommendation of an American as Assistant Secretary-General for Administrative and Financial Services, and the general question as to whether the U.S.

³ U.N. doc. A/INF/51 dated Dec. 5, 1952.

Government proposed to make recommendations with respect to other U.S. nationals to be employed in the Secretariat. J. B. Hutson was recommended for the post of Assistant Secretary-General by Secretary Byrnes and was appointed by Mr. Lie. At the same time, Secretary Byrnes indicated that it would be the policy of the U.S. Government not to make recommendations with respect to subordinate positions. The Department, in pursuance of this policy, has not recommended persons for employment in the Secretariat. It has not given instructions to the Secretary-General, nor has it assumed a responsibility for "clearing" employees.

When I assumed my present duties as Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs in August 1949, I found that the Department of State was concerned over the situation which investigative reports were disclosing. A few days after assuming these duties I discussed this problem with one of the principal assistants of the U.N. Secretary-General. As a result of our mutual concern with the problem, there was worked out a confidential arrangement under which the U.S. Government was to identify for the Secretary-General U.S. nationals employed by the United Nations or contemplated for employment who would appear to be members of the Communist Party or under Communist discipline. The purpose of this arrangement was to give the Secretary-General all the assistance we felt we could properly give him but without assuming any part of his responsibility.

Under this arrangement, the Secretary-General undertook to submit to the Department lists of names of U.S. nationals on the Secretariat or being considered for employment, with the request that the Department inform the United Nations whether readily available information disclosed any police or criminal record. The Department of State initiated name check investigations drawing upon such information as was available in the Department, together with such information as was made available on request by the FBI and other investigative agencies of the Government. The information was reviewed by the Department. A routine reply was then made to the United Nations on the question of evidence of a criminal or police record. If the national agency checks had produced information which was considered to warrant an adverse comment on the grounds of Communist membership or subjection to Communist discipline, this adverse comment was conveyed by word of mouth before despatch of the cover reply. The security practices of the U.S. Government made it impossible to communicate to the United Nations the detailed security information on which the adverse comment was based.

Let me emphasize that we did not undertake to "clear" anybody, and the Secretary-General understood this. Furthermore, as a consequence of

the confidential nature of the arrangement, the U.S. Government was not in a position to conduct full field investigations on Americans in the U.N. Secretariat. Such investigations would have become a matter of general knowledge and would have undermined the operation of the arrangement.

The arrangement thus operated under many handicaps. A considerable period was required for the U.S. Government to deal with individual cases. The removal of Americans identified under the arrangement by the Secretary-General required further time. Ill-advised or precipitate action would have revealed the confidential arrangement and made it even more difficult to bring about removal. The determination of loyalty in border-line cases was extremely difficult due to the dependence on information gained from normal channels and the inability to conduct and follow through on field investigations. Nevertheless, the arrangement was the best possible one under the circumstances and did produce results. The arrangement has achieved the dismissal of a number of Americans on whom the State Department transmitted adverse comments and has prevented the employment of others.

Throughout the period of the operation of the confidential arrangement, we have been involved in the serious and delicate problems inherent in an international staff of a world-wide organization. It is difficult for the United Nations to justify one rule for American employees and other rules for other nationalities. There are a number of valued and capable employees whose countries have lost their freedom since their employment by the United Nations. The home countries of these employees would welcome a chance to terminate their employment with the United Nations and to submit substitutes for them in the Secretariat. At the present time, approximately one-half of the nationals of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Secretariat were employed before the Communists took over the Governments of these countries, and the Secretary-General has resisted pressure from their present Governments to effect their removal. Competent Secretariat employees should be protected from political changes of government, peaceful or revolutionary, in their home countries, if an effective Secretariat is to be maintained.

Because of the complexities of the problem and of the U.S. concern, the Secretary-General on November 7 announced the appointment of a Commission of international jurists to study this whole problem and submit recommendations to him. On November 29 the Commission's report was published. In effect, the Commission of jurists concluded that the United Nations should not employ any person on whom he has reasonable grounds for belief that he is engaged or has been engaged or is likely to be engaged in subversive activities against the host government; and that the Secre-

tary-General of the United Nations had the authority to discharge and to deny employment to such U.S. nationals.

The Department of State has recommended to the President that he sign an Executive order taking full advantage of the conclusions and recommendations of the jurists' report and of the Secretary-General's acceptance of it. Under the proposed procedure the U.S. Government will screen present and proposed U.S. employees of the United Nations and transmit information to the Secretary-General to insure that only loyal Americans are employed.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORTHCOMING EXECUTIVE ORDER

Press release 931 dated December 30

At the direction of the President, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the Civil Service Commission have prepared an Executive order designed to assure that American citizens employed by the United Nations are loyal Americans and persons of the highest integrity, faithful to their obligations as international civil servants. The Executive order will establish a procedure for the screening of Americans on the U.N. Secretariat which is similar to the Federal loyalty program. This procedure was made possible by and formulated in the light of the conclusions and recommendations made in the report of the U.N. Commission of Jurists of November 29, 1952, and accepted by the U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie as the basis of his personnel policy.

The report of the jurists concluded that the Secretary-General has authority to remove Americans from his staff on the grounds of disloyalty to the host country, the United States. As stated by the jurists:

In exercising his responsibility for the selection and retention of staff the Secretary-General should regard it as of the first importance to refrain from engaging or to remove from the staff any person whom he has reasonable grounds for believing to be engaged or to have been engaged, or to be likely to be engaged in any subversive activities against the host country.

The jurists' report pointed up the difficulties for the Secretary-General in proceeding against a Secretariat employee on the basis alone of a member state's general conclusion that the person in question should be removed. The report suggested that the member state should give the Secretary-General evidence or information supporting its conclusion. These observations were made in connection with the jurists' affirmation that the selection and retention of the U.N. staff is the sole responsibility of the Secretary-General.

Following acceptance of the jurists' report by the Secretary-General, the Department of State informed the President that the report established a comprehensive and satisfactory basis for assur-

ing that only loyal Americans are employed on the U.N. Secretariat. Both the Department of State and the Secretary-General had been in agreement that subversive Americans should not be employed by the United Nations and that all appropriate steps should be taken to remove them. However, before the jurists' report, the Secretary-General had not found it possible to remove Americans on these stated grounds. This made it necessary that assistance given by the U.S. Government to the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities be on a highly confidential basis with all their limitations and attendant difficulties.

The Executive order will establish for Americans employed or being considered for employment by the United Nations a procedure of investigation, hearing, and review. Full field investigations will be conducted by the FBI on all persons other than minor employees. Full field investigations will be conducted even on minor employees when warranted by derogatory information developed by the Civil Service Commission in a preliminary investigation. Following investigation, individuals on whom adverse information is developed will be afforded the opportunity of hearings and review by the Civil Service Commission Regional Loyalty Boards and the Loyalty Review Board on the basis of the standards set forth in the Executive order.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be advised of the decisions of the Loyalty Boards together with the reasons therefor, stated in such detail as security considerations of the United States permit. Furthermore, at any stage in an investigation, the Secretary-General may be provided with derogatory information as a basis for suspension or other interim action pending a final determination by the Loyalty Boards. Under article 101 of the U.N. Charter, the decision as to employment or removal rests with the Secretary-General.

The new procedure will differ from former arrangements in four major respects. (1) For the first time, the United States will be able to give clearance to American employees in the United Nations. Until now it has not given clearance or a "clean bill of health" to anyone. (2) The information essential for a responsible and considered determination of the loyalty of Americans employed in the United Nations will now be available through investigative processes comparable to those for Federal employees, including full field investigations where necessary. (3) Americans employed in the United Nations will be protected in their rights through the hearing and appeal process. (4) The Secretary-General will have the benefit of pertinent information as a basis for his decisions.

It is expected that the Executive order will be issued promptly. Detailed plans for its implementation are being pressed urgently by the Civil

The United States is host to the United Nations at its headquarters in New York. It regards the United Nations as an important instrument for the promotion of international peace and security, and it has been the U.S. objective since its establishment to strengthen the United Nations so that it can fulfill the purposes of the Charter effectively and in accordance with its principles. The new procedure under the Executive order is in furtherance of that objective, and is consistent with the role of the United States as a faithful member, supporter, and host.

Press release 12 dated January 9

The President today issued an Executive order designed to assure that Americans employed by the United Nations are loyal Americans and persons of the highest integrity, faithful to their obligations as international civil servants. It is hoped that the procedures established under the Executive order will allay current anxiety about the loyalty of Americans employed by the U.N. Secretariat and will free from any taint of suspicion the vast majority of the 2,000 Americans whose service in the United Nations has been a credit to this Nation.

The U.N. is still a new organization. Only the tests of experience and the willingness of its member states to contribute to its strengthening will cure the imperfections of such a new organization. But, with these imperfections, the U.N. remains the best instrument at our disposal in the quest for international peace and security. As the host Government for the United Nations, it behooves us all to reaffirm our faith in the organization. We must never cease to work in a calm, orderly, and persistent manner toward the goal for which it was established and to do our utmost to help it to function effectively.

Prescribing procedures for making available to the Secretary General of the United Nations certain information concerning United States citizens employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations

WHEREAS a Commission of Jurists has advised the Secretary General of the United Nations that he should regard it as of the first importance to refrain from employing or to dismiss from employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations any United States citizen who he has reasonable grounds for believing has been, is, or is likely to be, engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States: and

WHEREAS the Commission of Jurists has further advised that the independence of the Secretary General and his sole responsibility to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the selection and retention of staff should be recognized by all Member Nations; and

WHEREAS the Secretary General has declared his intention to use the conclusions and recommendations of the opinion of the said Commission of Jurists as the basis of his personnel policy in discharging the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Charter and staff regulations of the United Nations; and

WHEREAS in the participation by the United States in the activities of the United Nations it is in the interest of the United States that United States citizens who are employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations be persons of the highest integrity and not persons who have been, are, or are likely to be, engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States; and

WHEREAS it is in the interest of the United States to establish a procedure for the acquisition of information by investigation and for its transmission to the Secretary General in order to assist the Secretary General in the exercise of his responsibility for determining whether any United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat has been, is, or is likely to be, engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States; and

WHEREAS such procedure should afford opportunity for hearing to any United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat as to whom an investigation discloses derogatory information, so that the person affected may challenge the accuracy of any such information;

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Department of State Bulletin

PART I - INVESTIGATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS EMPLOYED OR BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT ON THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Upon the receipt by the Secretary of State from the Secretary General of the United Nations of the name of and other necessary identifying data concerning each United States citizen employed or being considered for employment by the United Nations, there shall be an investigation of such person in accordance with the standard set forth in Part II of this order.

2. The Secretary of State shall forward the information received from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the United States Civil Service Commission, and the Commission shall conduct a preliminary investigation.

3. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Civil Service Commission of any such person shall be made at all available pertinent sources of information and shall include reference to:

- (a) Federal Bureau of Investigation files.
- (b) Civil Service Commission files.
- (c) Military and naval intelligence files as appropriate.
- (d) The files of any other appropriate Government investigative or intelligence agency.
- (e) The files of appropriate committees of the Congress.
- (f) Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the person, including municipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.
- (g) Schools and colleges attended by the person.
- (h) Former employers of the person.
- (i) References given by the person.
- (j) Any other appropriate source.

4. Whenever information revealed with respect to any such person is derogatory, within the standard set forth in Part II of this order, the United States Civil Service Commission shall forward the information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau shall conduct a full field investigation of such person: *Provided*, that in all cases involving a United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the internationally recruited staff of the United Nations, the investigation required by this Part shall be a full field investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

5. Reports of full field investigations shall be forwarded through the United States Civil Service Commission to the appropriate Regional Loyalty Board of the Civil Service Commission. Whenever such a report contains derogatory information, under the standard set forth in Part II of this order, there shall be made available to the person in question the procedures of the Civil Service Regional Loyalty Board (including the opportunity of a hearing) and the right of appeal to the Commission's Loyalty Review Board, in like manner as provided for with respect to employment with the executive branch of the Government of the United States under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended. The Regional Loyalty Board, or the Loyalty Review Board on appeal, shall transmit its determinations, together with the reasons therefor stated in such detail as security considerations permit, to the Secretary of State for transmission to the Secretary General of the United Nations for his use in exercising the responsibility with respect to the integrity of the personnel employed by the United Nations imposed upon him by the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations established by the General Assembly, and in light of the Report of the Commission of Jurists.

6. At any stage during the investigation or loyalty board proceeding the Secretary of State may forward to the Secretary General, in as much detail as the investigative and loyalty review agencies determine that security considerations will permit, the derogatory information disclosed by investigation. This shall be for the purpose of permitting the Secretary General to determine whether or

not he should take interim action with respect to the employee prior to the completion of the procedures outlined in this order. The making available of any such information shall be without prejudice to the right of full hearing and appeal as provided for herein.

7. The Secretary of State shall notify the Secretary General in all cases in which no derogatory information has been developed.

PART II - STANDARD


1. The standard to be used by a Regional Loyalty Board or by the Loyalty Review Board on appeal, in making an advisory determination as provided for in paragraph 5 of Part I of this order with respect to a United States citizen who is an employee or is being considered for employment by the United Nations, shall be whether or not on all the evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States.

2. Activities and associations of a United States citizen who is an employee or being considered for employment by the United Nations which may be considered in connection with the determination whether or not on all the evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States may include one or more of the following:

- (a) Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs.
- (b) Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof.
- (c) Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States.
- (d) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of United States documents or United States information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his previous employment by the Government of the United States or otherwise.
- (e) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, while an employee of the United States Government during a previous period, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
- (f) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, or group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

PART III - OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The provisions of Parts I and II of this order shall be applicable to United States citizens who are employees of, or are being considered for employment by, other public international organizations of which the United States Government is a member, by arrangement between the executive head of the international organization concerned and the Secretary of State or other officer of the United States designated by the President.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 9, 1953.

Migration Committee To Expand Services in 1953

FOURTH SESSION OF THE PROVISIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS FROM EUROPE

by George L. Warren

The fourth session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe was held at Geneva from October 13 through October 21, 1952.¹

The Migration Committee was established provisionally for 1 year at Brussels in December 1951, following the Conference on Migration, which was attended by 27 governments. Fifteen of the governments that were represented at Brussels participated in establishing the Committee; its purpose was to facilitate the movement out of Europe during 1 year of operations of approximately 100,000 migrants and refugees, who would not otherwise be moved.

The 19 governments which were represented as members of the Committee at the fourth session were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Sweden (which had joined since the third session), Switzerland, the United States, and Venezuela. Interested international organizations, the Holy See, and the following 10 governments were represented at this meeting by observers: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Norway, Panama, Peru, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. Bolivia was represented at the second session as a full member, but has not yet confirmed its membership in writing to the director.

At the fourth session the representative of Norway indicated informally that favorable parliamentary action on the membership of Norway might be expected shortly; this was confirmed

after the meeting by Norway's formal acceptance of membership. Word was received from the Argentine Government during the session that a decision to join the Committee had been reached, and the Committee was requested to send a representative to Rio de Janeiro after the meeting to negotiate for Argentina's membership. The representative of Costa Rica indicated informally his Government's interest in joining the Committee at an early date.

The following were elected to serve as officers at the fourth session: Count Giusti del Giardino (Italy), chairman, A. L. Nutt (Australia), first vice chairman, N. Hadji Vassiliou (Greece), second vice chairman, F. Donoso (Chile), *rapporteur*.

The Subcommittee on Finance, composed of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States, met from October 9 through October 11 and thereafter occasionally during the fourth session of the full Committee. The U.S. representative was elected chairman. The Subcommittee considered the report of the director on the budget and plan of expenditure for 1952, the proposed revised staff regulations, the proposed budget and plan of expenditure for 1953, the proposed scale of government contributions to the administrative budget for 1953, and the proposed revised financial regulations.

Total of 62,808 Moved From Europe

The Subcommittee found that between February 1 and September 30, 1952, the Committee had moved 62,808 persons out of Europe, including 23,876 refugees. Of the latter, 660 were moved with the assistance of voluntary agencies. It also found that the anticipated movement for the calendar year 1952 would approximate 100,000 as

¹ For articles by Mr. Warren on the Brussels Conference on Migration and the first, second, and third sessions of the Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169; *ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1952, p. 638; and *ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 107.

opposed to the 137,000 estimated at the second session of the Committee in February 1952. The sources and destinations of the 62,808 moved were as follows:

| <i>Countries of Emigration</i> | | <i>Countries of Immigration</i> | |
|--------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|--------|
| Austria | 10,375 | Australia | 10,702 |
| Far East | 600 | Brazil | 5,365 |
| Germany | 34,578 | Canada | 7,295 |
| Greece | 126 | Chile | 563 |
| Italy | 6,011 | Israel | 264 |
| Netherlands | 7,451 | United States | 36,618 |
| Trieste | 753 | Venezuela | 627 |
| Other | 2,914 | | |

In consequence of this reduced movement, the revised estimate of income for administrative expenditures for 1952 was \$2,252,080 as opposed to \$2,359,060 previously budgeted. The revised estimate of income for operations for 1952 was \$27,984,793 as against the earlier budget of \$38,991,600. Including \$20,890 of miscellaneous income, the estimated total income for 1952 was set down as \$30,257,763 as against the earlier figure of \$41,350,660. Contributions to the administrative budget received by September 30, 1952, totaled \$1,667,476, leaving a balance due of \$584,604, including \$196,391, the fourth quarter payment of the United States. Assuming the receipt of all estimated income and the final movement of 100,000 persons in the calendar year 1952, there would probably be a carry-over of resources on January 1, 1953, of approximately \$3,000,000, which was considered to be a minimum requirement if operations were to be continued in 1953.

The Subcommittee transmitted the estimate of income of \$30,257,763 and of expenditures of \$26,950,830 for the calendar year 1952 to the full Committee for its consideration. In doing so, the Subcommittee noted that the payment of contributions to the administrative budget by member governments had been very satisfactory, but that contributions to the operating fund for the payment of nonreimbursable movements would fall short by \$1,200,000 of the original estimate of \$11,000,000.

The Subcommittee reviewed in detail the proposed revised staff regulations, including a new salary scale, designed to provide more flexibility at no greater cost to the Committee, and transmitted the draft as revised to the full Committee. The Canadian and U.S. representatives expressed their preference for an all-inclusive salary scale at headquarters but did not press the issue. The Subcommittee also examined and transmitted to the full Committee the revised financial regulations submitted by the director for adoption in the event that operations were continued beyond December 31, 1952.

The Subcommittee on Finance also examined a proposed revision of the scale of allocations to member governments of contributions to the administrative expenditures for 1953, which was set forth both in terms of percentages and units with a proposed value for each unit. One hundred percent of the administrative expenditures for

1953 was allocated to the existing membership. Additional allocations were made to prospective members. The allocation to the United States remained at 33.33 percent as in the original scale effective for 1952. The percentages assigned to other members were in all cases slightly increased. However, the total dollar amount of each contribution for 1953 was less than the respective contribution for 1952, due to the lower budget of administrative expenditures for 1953. The revised scale was transmitted to the full Committee for consideration and adoption.

Expansion of Committee's Activities Proposed

Having considered the progress report of the director covering the period from June 1 to September 30, 1952, the full Committee dealt first with the question of continuing the Committee's activities after December 31, 1952. The governments of certain emigration and immigration countries proposed the adoption of a resolution prolonging the activities of the Committee indefinitely beyond December 31, 1952. The discussion on the continuance of the Committee's activities was influenced substantially by the "Report on Technical Aid and International Financing for the Encouragement of Migratory Movements from Europe," made by the director in accordance with the Brazilian resolution adopted at the third session. This resolution requested the director to confer with other international organizations active in the field of migration with a view to reporting to the Committee at its fourth session the findings and conclusions of these organizations with respect to ways and means of facilitating migration through technical assistance and international financing, which might be of significance to the Committee in its efforts to achieve greater movement out of Europe. The director's report suggested that the Committee expand its services and, in particular, participate in the organization and financing of pilot colonization projects.

The argument presented by those governments which proposed to establish the Committee on a permanent basis was, briefly, that the Committee's experience in 1952, while fully justifying the establishment and continuation of the Committee, had shown that the mere movement of migrants and refugees, even with passage supplied for some at the expense of the Committee, had not produced the anticipated impact on the problems of surplus populations and refugees in Europe. In order to make a more effective contribution to the resolution of these problems, the Committee would need to expand its activities and devote attention to the possibilities of increasing the volume of migration from Europe through the encouragement of colonization schemes. To do this it would be necessary to give the Committee permanent status. In the discussion the representatives of cer-

tain immigration countries—notably, Australia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela—took the position that a substantial increase above the present movement of migrants to their countries could take place only if accompanied by the investment of external capital in colonization projects.

The representatives of other member governments, including the United States, indicated that they were not prepared or authorized at this session of the Committee to consider the prolongation of the Committee's activities beyond the calendar year 1953. The future of the Committee and its terms of reference might be considered, however, during the sessions of the Committee to be held in 1953. These governments indicated also that they were not prepared to authorize the Committee at this time to engage in the management, operation, or financing of colonization projects but would support the offer of staff services by the Committee to the interested governments of emigration and immigration countries which might develop colonization projects cooperatively. It was envisaged that the participation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the financing of these projects might be sought.

Committee To Continue Under New Title

The resolution finally adopted on the question of the continuance of the Committee's activities and on the "Report of the Director on Technical Aid and International Financing of Migration" provided that the Committee would continue operations during 1953 under the title "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration," that it would expand its services directly connected with movement under the terms of the Brussels resolution, and that it would make its staff available to assist interested governments of emigration and immigration countries to develop a formula for the financing of colonization projects which might make possible the successful presentation of such projects to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development by these governments. All other proposals for activities by the Committee not covered by the basic resolution adopted at Brussels² would be presented to the Committee at its next session, as expanded terms of reference in a draft constitution proposing a more permanent status for the Committee.

The budget and plan of expenditures for 1953 as originally presented was based on a quota of movement during 1953 of 140,000. The Subcommittee on Finance considered this estimate optimistic. The director therefore revised the budget and plan of expenditures for 1953 to provide for a quota of movement of 120,000, administrative expenditures of \$2,147,000 as recommended by the Subcommittee on Finance, and operational ex-

penditures of \$34,608,475—a total of \$36,755,475. An item of \$600,000 was included in this budget, which was finally adopted by the full Committee, to provide for the improvement and expansion of services in processing migrants prior to movement and in the distribution of migrants after arrival in the reception countries—such services to be undertaken only at the request of governments and under the terms of the Brussels resolution. It was reported in the discussion that the governments of certain countries, such as Italy, Brazil, and Venezuela, were more interested than formerly in calling upon the Committee for expert services of this character. The discussion also suggested that the movement of migrants might be increased up to 25 percent by such services, even under existing immigration potentialities.

The Committee adopted revised staff and financial regulations and a new scale of allocations to member governments of contributions to the administrative expenditures. These actions were made necessary by the decision to continue the Committee's activities during 1953 and the developments during the current year.

The discussions of the Committee at its fourth session clearly showed that the countries of emigration—Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands—were anxious to achieve a larger movement of migrants out of Europe. Unfortunately, the contraction in movements to Australia and Canada, anticipated to be temporary at the previous session, had continued during the fall of 1952, and movements to the Latin American countries, though promising, had not attained the desired momentum. The cessation of movement to the United States, owing to the termination of the U.S. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, was also an important factor in reducing the volume of movement. These developments, however, served to renew the determination of the Committee to exercise every resource to exploit and to increase existing possibilities of immigration. The Committee was encouraged in this effort by the offers of collaboration and assistance made by the other international organizations which participated as observers in the Committee's session.

The United States was represented by George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. representative for International Organization Affairs, Geneva, served as alternate representative. The advisers were Guy J. Swope, Chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany; Eric M. Hughes, Deputy Chief, Escapee Program Coordinating Unit, Frankfurt; and David E. Christian, Paris office, Mutual Security Agency.

The Committee decided to convene its fifth session at Geneva in March 1953.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State.*

² For text of this resolution, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 171.

U.N.

St
U

U.S./U.N.

The
posed
lands,
reach
nate th
Austri

As o
the Un
contin
tion of
to Aus

The
that th
intend
indep
again
the So
of Vi
Tolbu
Austri

The
to conc
defeat
liberati
The
Allied

The
justifi
of the
fied or
transf
and to
politi
peopl
Austri
trans
tyran
leave
to an
entire

¹ Ma
Dec. 1
² U.N.

Janu

U.N. Support for Early Austrian Settlement

Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 17

The United States welcomes the resolution proposed by Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, and the Netherlands,² calling upon the governments concerned to reach agreement on an Austrian treaty to terminate the occupation of Austria and to restore to Austria its rights to sovereign statehood.

As one of the Four Powers occupying Austria, the United States on its part has sought, and will continue to seek, to carry out the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, that promised to restore to Austria her freedom and independence.

There can and should be no misunderstanding that the Moscow Declaration proclaimed and was intended to proclaim the restoration of Austrian independence as one of the objectives of the war against Nazi tyranny. It was so recognized by the Soviet Union: in a proclamation to the citizens of Vienna in March 1945, the late Marshal Tolbukhin, commanding the Russian forces in Austria, said:

The Red Army has set foot on the soil of Austria not to conquer Austrian territory. Its aim is exclusively the defeat of the enemy German-Fascist troops and the liberation of Austria.

The Red Army backs the Moscow Declaration of the Allied Powers on the independence of Austria.

The temporary occupation of Austria can be justified only as a war measure. The continuance of the occupation following the war can be justified only to the extent necessary to effect an orderly transfer of sovereign power to the Austrian people and to insure the removal of the tentacles, military, political, and economic, by which the Austrian people were held in the thrall of foreign tyranny. Austria's independence cannot be restored by transferring Austria from the tentacles of one tyranny to those of another. We are pledged to leave Austria free and not enslaved by or beholden to any foreign power, and by that pledge in its entirety the United States intends to stand.

Early in 1946 at the Council of Foreign Ministers the United States urged that consideration be given to an Austrian treaty to restore Austria's independence, and the United States continued so to urge at subsequent meetings of the Council. In a formal declaration on October 28, 1946, the United States reaffirmed that it "regarded Austria as a country liberated from forcible domination by Nazi Germany and not as an ex-enemy state."

The United States proposed that the four occupying powers should join not in a peace treaty as with an enemy state but in a state treaty with the liberated Austrian State recognizing its independence. In this position the United States had the support of the United Kingdom and France.

But it was not until early 1947 that the Soviet Union was willing to begin a discussion of the Austrian treaty. Since that time, 376 quadripartite meetings have been held; 33 were held in the Council of Foreign Ministers, 85 in the Austrian Treaty Commission, and 258 by the Austrian Treaty Deputies—but there is still no Austrian treaty.

The efforts of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to conclude a treaty which would restore to Austria its freedom and independence have been frustrated by the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union. In the negotiations the Soviet Union conditioned its agreement to an Austrian treaty upon the settlement of specific problems on their own terms. The terms on which the Soviet Union insisted were not calculated to safeguard the sovereign independence of Austria but to perpetuate the dependency of Austria upon the Soviet Union even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the summer of 1949 far-reaching concessions were made by the Western Powers to the Soviet Union and it was thought that a compromise agreement had been reached on the principal points standing in the way of a treaty. But no sooner was tentative agreement reached on these points than the Soviet Union insisted on new and some entirely extraneous conditions to the conclusion of the treaty. It would seem that the Soviet Union has little interest in a treaty to restore Austrian independence but is concerned

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 18.

² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.16 dated Dec. 17.

only to perpetuate and increase its power over Austria.

Soviet Attitude on German Assets in Austria

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Austrian treaty is most significantly revealed by its attitude on the problem of German assets in Austria.

Under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement, reparation claims of the Allied Powers against Germany were to be met in part from appropriate external German assets. It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria itself.

There was nothing in the Potsdam Agreement which detracted or could in good faith be construed to detract from the solemn Allied pledge in the Moscow Declaration that Austria should be restored as a free and independent State. There was, moreover, nothing in the Potsdam Agreement which detracted or could in good faith be construed to detract from the solemn Allied pledges in the London Declaration of January 5, 1943, that the Allied Powers would do their utmost to defeat methods of dispossession practiced by enemy governments in enemy-controlled countries, even though the dispossession was apparently legal in form or purported to be voluntarily effected.

But despite the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and the London Declaration of 1943, the Soviet Union in its zone in Eastern Austria seized, under the claim of German external assets, hundreds of properties including (1) properties legally owned by the Austrian State; (2) properties seized by force and duress from legitimate owners by the Nazis; and (3) properties owned in part or in whole, not by Germans but by U.N. nationals.

In 1947 the Soviet Union transferred all these assets which it had seized in its zone to Soviet corporations, which have administered them without regard to Austrian laws and to the detriment of the Austrian economy. These corporations have become an *imperium in imperio* in disregard of Austrian sovereignty. They have claimed exemption from taxes, custom duties, and other laws of the land. Through these corporations the Soviet Union has put itself in a position to exert a strangle hold on the economic life of Austria.

This action of the Soviet Union, based upon its own unilateral and wholly unwarranted interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, has cost Austria the use of properties valued conservatively in excess of 700 million dollars. These properties include, in addition to 300 industrial enterprises, over 200,000 acres of farm lands and forests.

The loss to Austria of the production of these properties and the loss of taxes and custom duties is figured in hundreds of millions of dollars. From oil production alone, the loss exceeds the amount which Austria would have been called upon to pay annually to the Soviet Union had a treaty been

Text of Austrian Treaty Resolution¹

U.N. doc. A/Resolution 61
Dated December 23, 1952

The General Assembly,

RECALLING the terms of resolution 190 (III) of 3 November 1948, whereby an appeal was made to the great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace,

RECALLING the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, whereby the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America recognized that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent State,

RECALLING FURTHER that the Government of France joined the three above-mentioned Governments in said declaration as of 16 November 1943,

CONSIDERING that, in the spirit of said declaration, the four Powers accepted the responsibility of re-establishing a free and independent Austria, and, to that end, have entered into negotiations toward the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty,

NOTING WITH CONCERN that those negotiations, which have been under way intermittently since 1947, have hitherto failed to bring about the proposed objective,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that such state of affairs, still prevailing after a lapse of seven years since the liberation of Austria at the end of the Second World War, and arising from the inconclusive stage of the aforementioned negotiations, does constitute a source of deep disappointment for the Austrian people, who have by themselves made successful efforts toward the restoration and democratic reconstruction of their country,

RECOGNIZING that only through the unhampered exercise by the Austrian people of their freedom and independence can these efforts attain full realization,

TAKING FURTHER INTO ACCOUNT that such state of affairs hinders the full participation by Austria in the normal and peaceful relations of the community of nations and the full exercise of the powers inherent in its sovereignty,

HAVING IN MIND that the solution of this problem would constitute an important step towards the elimination of other areas of disagreement and therefore towards the creation of conditions favourable to the accomplishment of world peace,

DESIRING to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security and the developing of friendly relations among nations in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

ADDRESSES an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian Treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in its sovereignty.

¹ The resolution was adopted by Committee I on Dec. 19 by a vote of 48-0-2 (Pakistan and Afghanistan); the Soviet bloc of five did not participate. The plenary session approved the resolution on Dec. 20 by an identical vote.

concluded upon the basis of compromise proposals made by the Western Powers in the summer of 1949.

Those proposals, as I have said, constituted major concessions on the part of the Western

Department of State Bulletin

Power
prom
A wr
prove
Inc
into
to be
Sovie
would
of th
would
assets
Wi
curre
was r
volve
on th
Only
agree
were

Extran

The
taking
negot
questi
for p
the A
close

This
Union
the tr
dom,
had m
Gover

The
peas"
of the
over
dried
peas,
from
Russi

The
cult.
They
Austr
from
quiry

How
tinue
Power
of thi
treaty

The
agree
As th
debt b
they c
extran
questi
zation

Janua

Powers to the Soviet Union. For a time they promised to break the long stalemate on the treaty. A written statement of agreed principles was approved by all Four Powers.

Incorporating the provisions of the agreement into agreed articles of a treaty, however, proved to be more difficult. Finally, in October 1949, the Soviet Foreign Minister declared his Government would raise no further difficulties on the remainder of the unagreed articles if the Western Powers would accept the Soviet position on the German assets.

With this statement in mind and with the concurrence of the Austrian Government, agreement was reached on article 35 of the treaty, which involved further concessions to the Soviet viewpoint on the troublesome question of German assets. Only five relatively minor articles remained unagreed. It seemed as if the conclusion of the treaty were surely in sight.

Extraneous Issues Raised by the Soviets

The Soviets, however, shortly raised a new issue, taking the position that there could be no further negotiations on the unagreed articles until the question of Austria's debt to the Soviet Union for payment of supplies and services delivered to the Austrian Government by the Soviets at the close of the war was settled.

This was a matter completely between the Soviet Union and Austria. It had nothing to do with the treaty. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France were in no way involved. They had made no claims of this nature on the Austrian Government.

The Austrians speak of this claim as the "dried peas" debt. Its history goes back to the early days of the Allied occupation when the Soviets turned over to Austrian authorities large quantities of dried peas to feed the hungry population. The peas, it is alleged by the Austrians, actually were from Wehrmacht stores in Vienna which the Russians had captured.

The Austrians had found settling this debt difficult. The Soviets had refused to set a figure. They had ignored Austrian notes. In fact, the Austrians had been unable to obtain even a reply from the Soviet Government to the Austrian inquiry regarding payment.

However, in order that this issue might not continue to block conclusion of the treaty, the Western Powers finally offered to accept the Soviet version of this alleged debt and include it in the draft treaty.

The Soviets, however, refused to consent to agreement even on terms defined by themselves. As the insincerity of the Soviet position on this debt became too obvious for even Soviet comfort, they dropped it but raised the even more clearly extraneous issue of Trieste and, subsequently, questions relating to denazification and demilitarization of Austria.

These questions were not germane to the Austrian treaty or within the competence of the Austrian Treaty Deputies, whose sole function is to negotiate and to conclude an Austrian treaty.

Trieste is, of course, a question related to the Italian treaty. Austria has nothing to do with Trieste and can do nothing about Trieste. The Soviet Union is simply using Austria as a pawn in the Soviet Union's struggle to cling to and extend its own power in Central Europe.

As for demilitarization, the Allied Council in Vienna in 1947, after a Four Power survey of the entire country, reported that Austria possessed no military organizations, no military fortifications, no military armaments, no aircraft, no warships, and no naval installations.

The occupation forces do not permit possession by Austria of any of these items. She is not permitted to have even a civilian airplane, let alone military aircraft. In other words the country is, and has been for 7 years, completely demilitarized.

The only military forces in Austria today are those of the Allied Powers, and the facts are that the Soviet forces far exceed the combined strength of the Western Powers forces. Their military installations and airfields far outnumber those of the Western Powers. It is ridiculous, therefore, to say that Austria cannot be granted a treaty because it is not demilitarized. The one way to demilitarize Austria is to conclude a treaty which will rid Austria of foreign troops which it does not want.

The Soviet charge that the Austrian Government has failed to denazify is equally specious. Austria has complied with the denazification laws approved by the Allied Council. There are no blood purges or concentration camps in Austria. There are free elections and free political parties in Austria and an independent judiciary which insures respect for human rights. Austria may have some shortcomings, as have all other states, but Austria has freed itself from the Nazi patterns which are all too evident in the regimes of its Cominform neighbors.

Recent Attempts To Break the Impasse

I will speak briefly of more recent developments concerning the Austrian treaty. In a further and renewed effort to conclude a treaty, the Western Powers proposed a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies in London in January 1952. The Soviets refused to attend this meeting, again raising the extraneous issues to which I have referred.

In order to break this impasse, the Western Powers proposed on March 13, 1952, a short, simple treaty containing only the minimum essentials to an Austrian settlement and giving Austria real freedom as repeatedly promised by all four occupying powers. This abbreviated treaty contains only eight articles, all but one of which are agreed articles from the old, long draft treaty.

The single new article relates to the German assets. It calls for the relinquishment to Austria of all property, real and personal, of whatever description, held or claimed, by all of the occupying powers as German assets.

The Western Powers felt that this step was nothing less than simple justice in light of the fact that Austria has now been occupied for 7 years and that hundreds of millions of dollars have been drained from her economic assets. Concessions made by the Western Powers to give Austria prompt relief from the burdens of occupation cannot be indefinitely maintained when that prompt relief is not forthcoming.

In view of the heavy burdens which the prolonged occupation had imposed on Austria, we hoped that the Soviet Union would accept this abbreviated treaty.

The Soviet Government, however, refused to do so, despite an offer by the Western Powers to include four other agreed articles from the long draft treaty. The Soviet Union replied to this offer by raising again the same extraneous issues previously referred to and once again failed to appear for a meeting of the Treaty Deputies in London on September 29, 1952.

It is not the Western Powers' insistence on the exact terms of a long or a short treaty which stands in the way of the restoration of a free and independent Austria. It is, I am sorry to say, the intransigence of the Soviet Union which continues to use Austria as a pawn for its own imperialistic purposes and its own aggrandizement. The Western Powers are willing to accept any treaty in terms adequate to insure the restoration of Austria's independence and its freedom from foreign domination.

The United States does not consider it necessary to contrast the liberality of the occupation forces of the Western Powers in Austria with the oppressive character of the Soviet occupation policy. The record of the Western Powers in this regard is well known. An examination of this record would convince anyone that the Western Powers have, in the absence of a treaty, made every effort to ameliorate Austria's situation and to grant to the Austrian Government, to the greatest extent possible within the terms of existing occupation agreements, control of its own affairs. They will continue to do so.

The Brazilian resolution asks only simple justice for Austria; it asks only that the Four Powers which have occupied Austria since 1945 fulfill their pledged word under the Moscow Declaration and the U.N. Charter.

Austria has earned the restoration of her sovereignty and independence. Austria has reestablished its democratic Constitution of 1929, which guarantees the preservation of democratic rights and interests of the individual. Since the autumn of 1945, there have been in Austria free elections and free political parties.

The Austrian Government, established following the 1945 elections, is recognized by the Governments of the occupying powers and maintains normal diplomatic relations with many governments throughout the world.

Austria has applied for membership in the United Nations and, in the view of my Government, deserves admission to membership in this organization. The General Assembly has recommended favorable action on Austria's application for membership. Even the Soviet Union considered Austria as qualified for membership under its package proposal.

Despite the failure of past efforts, my Government will continue to press for an honorable settlement of the Austrian treaty question, asking only that such a settlement leave Austria in full sovereign control of its political and economic destiny.

We are entirely willing to meet with representatives of the Soviet Union to discuss and conclude such a treaty. We will meet again and again and again. But our experience of these past 7 years leaves little hope for arriving shortly at a satisfactory conclusion unless something more is added.

Perhaps this resolution is that something more.

My Government urges that the General Assembly place the moral weight of the United Nations behind the effort to secure a just settlement of this issue in accordance with Charter principles.

Austria seeks only justice. And it is justice long delayed. My Government believes that Austria is entitled to its freedom and independence under the Charter. The United States, therefore, supports the resolution submitted by Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, and the Netherlands.

General Assembly's Role in the Palestine Question

*Statement by Philip C. Jessup
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 19

In order to explain the view of the delegation of the United States and the vote which we shall cast on the draft resolution and amendment before us,² it is necessary very briefly to indicate the point of view of the U.S. delegation concerning the role of the General Assembly in this Palestine question which is now under consideration.

It seems to us that the interest and purpose of

¹ Made on Dec. 18 in plenary session in explanation of vote on the Palestine item. The resolution urging the parties to the dispute to enter into direct negotiations failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority at the Dec. 18 meeting; the vote was 24-21-15.

² U.N. docs. A/AC. 61/L. 23/Rev. 4 and A/L. 134.

the G
tion is
ment o
this p
that g
sured,
ture o
firm a
my d
Assem
sembly
a deleg
will co
tion of
Wh
its con
ommer
rious c
becam
be imp
Just
1948,
gation
sembly
marke
power
them
it beco
agreed
Gener
has no
solutio
but ra
ods an
might
is the
tee has
this qu
Both
sion o
earnes
which
ticular
concer
year i
going
Gener
on the
will be
objecti
fined
judgm
Hoc P
ing to
which
Wh
in the
gation
nection
in the

the General Assembly in considering this question is to aid, insofar as it can, toward the achievement of a solution of this difficult problem. Until this problem is solved, the peace and prosperity of that great area of the Middle East cannot be assured, and until that is assured, the whole structure of international peace cannot be considered firm and permanent. Therefore, it has seemed to my delegation that each step taken by the General Assembly, each vote passed in the General Assembly, must be influenced by the conclusion of a delegation: whether that step, whether that vote, will contribute toward the achievement of a solution of the Palestine question.

When the General Assembly, 5 years ago, began its consideration of the Palestine question, it recommended definite substantive solutions for various elements of the Palestine problem. But it became generally realized that solutions could not be imposed upon the parties.

Just 4 years ago last Thursday, December 11, 1948, John Foster Dulles, speaking for the delegation of the United States at the General Assembly session in Paris, on this question, remarked: "The General Assembly does not have the power to command them [the parties] or lay upon them precise injunctions."³ Since that is true, it becomes obvious that any solution must be an agreed solution and, in the last year or so, the General Assembly, having taken that into account, has not sought to determine the actual substantive solution of elements of the problem in Palestine, but rather has recommended to the parties methods and procedures by which they themselves might agree upon some such solution. And that is the course which the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee has followed this year in its consideration of this question.

Both in the Committee and in the plenary session of the General Assembly we all make an earnest effort to agree upon some recommendation which might be unanimously accepted, and, particularly, might be accepted by the states directly concerned with the problem. Unfortunately, this year it is apparent that that happy result is not going to be attained. In those circumstances the General Assembly must exercise its best judgment on the propositions laid before it as to what course will be most helpful, having in mind our ultimate objective. We must proceed, by the processes defined for the General Assembly, to express that judgment; and it is precisely that which the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee has done in recommending to the General Assembly the draft resolution which is before it.

When this draft resolution was first introduced in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee by eight delegations, its language was very simple. In connection with the chief issue which has developed in the debates, it is well to recall this—that the

draft resolution as originally introduced simply called upon the parties to enter into direct negotiations.

In the course of the Committee's consideration, various changes have been made in the resolution in order to meet the objections which were advanced to it in its original form. It was argued in the Committee that this simple appeal for direct negotiations would constitute an impairment of the rights of some of the parties, that it would prejudice their rights. Accordingly, we now find in the resolution as it comes to us the express words that the entering into direct negotiations shall be "without prejudice to their respective rights and claims."

It was argued in the Committee that the simple form of the resolution ignored the previous resolutions of the General Assembly as if they were being repealed or as if they were lost sight of and deemed to be of no account. Accordingly, in the course of the debates in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, additional words were inserted to provide that in these direct negotiations the parties should be advised to bear in mind the resolutions, as well as the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question. It was also suggested that in connection with the problem of the Holy Places in Palestine there were interests of third parties which should also be borne in mind, and language was adopted in the resolution now before us which would take that into account also.

Emphasis on Direct and Unconditional Negotiations

It seems to me quite clear that in the resolution as it comes to us, with the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, there is no surrender or impairment of rights suggested. On behalf of the delegation of the United States, I pointed out in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee,⁴ and I reaffirm it here on behalf of my delegation, that the language of this resolution does not mean that the parties, in undertaking direct negotiations, should first abandon what they consider to be their legitimate rights and interests or cast aside the expressions of the General Assembly's views that have been set forth in the various resolutions on Palestine. We believe that direct negotiations should be direct and unconditional, and that the parties on the one hand and on the other should enter into these direct negotiations uncontrolled by any prior assertion or prior condition, that it should be a free and open negotiation.

As we entered into our discussion of this question in plenary meeting of the General Assembly, we were confronted with an amendment introduced by the Philippine delegation. I think that our consideration of that amendment must again be guided by our answer to the question: will the adoption of this amendment help in serving our fundamental purposes? As I have already stated,

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1948, p. 793.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 953.

it seems to me clear, and the representative of Panama has pointed this out, that the adoption of this amendment would not succeed in securing that unanimity which we all would so much like to see. Therefore, we must examine it in its particular parts to see the utility and effect of each part of the amendment.

As we examine it, it is quite clear, at least to my delegation, that it introduces no new concept which is not already to be found in the resolution which comes to us from the Committee. In the first place, the amendment suggests that the words "bearing in mind" should be replaced by the words "on the basis of." It might seem to one who has not followed the debates that this is an innocent and meaningless change of language, but to those who have followed these discussions through long and sometimes weary hours in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee it is well known that this question of the exact expression to be used in this context engaged the attention of the Committee over a very considerable period of time, that various formulae were suggested, and I believe that on the basis of that discussion one is forced to the conclusion that the inclusion of these words "on the basis of" would result at least in the conclusion in some minds that the negotiations were to be based upon certain conditions, in other words, that we would be back at the conditional type of negotiation, which my delegation does not think the proper approach to direct negotiations. We believe, therefore, that the original language in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, on this point, should be maintained.

Secondly, there is a suggestion that we should add at the end of paragraph 4 the words "and, in particular, the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem." It seems to me that that would not be a wise addition to the resolution. In the first place, the specific example which is here proposed to be included in the resolution, namely, the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem, is precisely that one task which cannot be accomplished merely by the direct negotiations of the parties. The parties may facilitate the result, but the internationalization of Jerusalem, as has been apparent from all the previous debates of the General Assembly, is an international task and not a task which is confined solely to the negotiations of the parties. In the second place, we know that there are several points which are of major concern in a final settlement on Palestine. They have been mentioned by various representatives this morning, and they include particularly the territorial question and the question of refugees, and these are not particularly called to mind. The question arises, why should we call to mind one question and not the other questions?

Moreover, it seems to me we are all highly conscious of the fact that this question of the internationalization of Jerusalem has a very deep and sacred meaning for many peoples throughout the

world and for peoples of many faiths. I cast no doubt at all upon the motives of the representatives of the Philippines who introduced this amendment, nor upon the motives of those who support this amendment, but I do fear that the introduction of this idea in this form at the last moment of our considerations might lead in some minds to a suspicion that this is an element thrown into the parliamentary consideration of this question for some parliamentary reason, and not solely on the basis of the deep religious concern which so many of us have in the ultimate solution of this problem.

Specific Issues Before the Assembly

More broadly, the question which concerns this General Assembly in voting on this amendment and on this resolution is this: We are not being asked to vote for or against resolutions passed by the General Assembly in 1947 or in 1948 or in 1949 or any other year. We are being asked to vote on a specific resolution recommended to us by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and upon a specific amendment to that resolution. We must make up our minds as to the wisdom of the adoption of the particular amendment to that resolution recommended to us. It is impossible to say that when one votes on the question of substituting words one is, on the basis of that, expressing a fundamental opinion as to the soundness or wisdom of this or that paragraph of some prior resolution of this General Assembly adopted some 4 or 5 years ago. Similarly, when one votes on the question of adding some words referring to the internationalization of Jerusalem, one is not being asked to vote here as to whether one favors internationalization or whether one believes that is the way to protect the Holy Places and to regulate that part of the whole Palestine question. That is not the issue upon which we are going to vote, and anyone who votes against the addition of this phrase is not saying he does not believe in the internationalization of Jerusalem. We are considering, as I have said, the addition of particular words to a particular resolution, looked at from the point of view of the total result which this Assembly will produce in the expression of its opinion on the issues which are now before us for decision at this stage of the perennial discussion of the Palestine question.

Finally, in closing I should like to remind my fellow representatives that many of us have been through a number of debates on this Palestine question at a number of different sessions of the General Assembly.

Many of us remember that in previous sessions of the General Assembly we have found that in the course of our debates we have been conscious of very strong differences of opinion as to the wise course to follow in the framing of a resolution. I am very happy to recall that on previous occa-

sions,
no lon
ceeded
practic
able to
in our

On
United
ciliatio
bly an
cerned
Palest
States
all ass
efforts
problem

For
tion w
will m
the ori
Comm

U. S.

Statem
Deputy

I rep
agreed
would
or und
[Frank
United
the Sec
feel org
repres
be basi

The
that he
either
differen
the sol
contain
way of
tions o

' Made
meeting
olution
Netherla
draft, un
negotiat
Represent
specific
cease-fire
quotation
of the U
Nov. 17,
the U.S.
did not

sions, when the sound of the eloquent arguments no longer echoed in our ears and when we proceeded to deal realistically with situations which practically confronted us as governments, we were able to go forward again in unity and in harmony in our common effort to solve the problem.

On behalf of the U.S. delegation—since the United States is a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission—I wish to assure the Assembly and particularly to assure those states concerned with this problem that as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission the United States remains and continues to be ready to offer all assistance in its power to the parties in any efforts they may make toward the solution of this problem.

For the reasons I have given, the U.S. delegation will oppose the Philippine amendment and will maintain its vote for the draft resolution in the original form in which it came to us from the Committee.

U. S. Reaffirms Position on Kashmir

Statement by John C. Ross

Deputy U. S. Representative in Security Council¹

I repeat the view of my Government that any agreement of the parties on a just basis which would settle the dispute, whether reached directly or under the auspices of the U.N. representative [Frank P. Graham], would be welcomed by the United States. The cosponsors have put before the Security Council a draft resolution which we feel organizes some of the suggestions of the U.N. representative on the issue which we consider to be basic—the question of demilitarization.

The U.N. representative has told the parties that he will at all times welcome suggestions from either Government directed to settling the main differences between them and therefore directed to the solution of the dispute. Therefore, nothing contained in the draft resolution stands in the way of the parties coming forward with suggestions of their own. Nothing in the resolution

alters or reduces in any way the powers of the U.N. representative under the previous resolutions.

I consider it undesirable, unnecessary, and unconstructive to go back into the history of this case and reexamine the basis of the resolutions of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan. Therefore, I do not propose to discuss the charge of aggression. To my Government the important political fact for us is that the parties have agreed that the accession of Kashmir will be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. That is the agreement and the principle which we are attempting to help the parties to turn into a reality. In the opinion of my Government the draft resolution before the Security Council rests foursquare on this agreement embodied in those resolutions.

Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the view which the U.N. representative has expressed that an early agreement on demilitarization would have as one immediate practical result the induction into office of the plebiscite administrator who could then proceed with his necessary study of the entire problem of a plebiscite.

Now a word about the two amendments suggested by the representative of the Netherlands dealing with the procedures under which negotiations would be conducted. The representative of the Netherlands is quite correct in recalling the view of my Government that the draft resolution is not intended in any way to impair or limit the authority of the U.N. representative and our expectation that he will continue to exercise his functions under the previous resolutions of the Security Council. I think it is fair to say that in doing so we would expect that negotiations of the parties would be under his auspices. Therefore the United States is glad to accept the amendment offered by the representative of the Netherlands which would make explicit in the draft resolution our intention that these negotiations be conducted under the auspices of Dr. Graham.

In accordance with his authority and responsibility, it is fitting that the place where the negotiations take place should be left to the U.N. representative. We should not expect him in the time at his disposal and after the months of effort which he has put into this case to travel back and forth considerable distances in conferring first with one party and then the other. Without in any sense attempting to make a determination for him, it occurs to me that in this stage, as in the previous stage, the U.N. facilities at Geneva might be particularly useful and appropriate for these negotiations.

The draft resolution calls upon the parties to report and authorizes the U.N. representative to report on what transpires. We have no preconceived idea of the nature of the report which the parties and which the U.N. representative would

¹ Made in the Security Council on Dec. 23. At the same meeting, the Council adopted the amended U.S.-U.K. resolution on Kashmir; the amendment, proposed by the Netherlands and accepted by the sponsors of the original draft, urges India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations "under the auspices of the United Nations Representative" in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line after demilitarization. The passage in quotation marks replaces the words "at the Headquarters of the United Nations" in the original draft (BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 801). The Council's vote was 9-0, with the U.S.S.R. abstaining; as an interested party, Pakistan did not participate.

consider it appropriate to make. It may well be that the parties will ask the U.N. representative to synthesize and put before us as part of his report their respective views. But that is a procedural matter on which we feel the parties and the U.N. representative should have a considerable degree of flexibility to decide those questions among themselves.

My Government regrets that both parties to

this dispute have not found it possible to accept the draft resolution. However, we believe that the draft resolution has meaning and importance because it represents a careful study and appreciation of the U.N. representative's suggestions which, after 16 months of work, it is appropriate for the Council to make. We therefore urge the members of the Security Council to vote in favor of the draft resolution.

Chinese Communists Reject U. N. Proposals on Prisoners of War

On December 5, 1952, Lester B. Pearson, President of the seventh session of the General Assembly, cabled messages to Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Government, and Pak Hen En, North Korean Foreign Minister, transmitting the text of the resolution on Korea which the General Assembly adopted on December 3.¹ Printed below are Mr. Pearson's message to the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister and excerpts from the latter's reply:

Mr. Pearson's Message of December 5

The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 399th plenary meeting on December 3, 1952, adopted a resolution under item 16 (a) of its agenda—Korea: Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Under the terms of that resolution, originally sponsored by the Government of India, the President of the General Assembly is requested "to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean Authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appropriate."

In discharge of the duty placed upon me by the terms of that resolution, I have the honor to transmit to you the text of the resolution and to invite your acceptance of the proposals contained therein.

I send this message to you against the back-

ground of the casualties, the sufferings and the destruction in Korea which are inevitable consequences of war, and I add my personal appeal that you should give it your most thoughtful and sympathetic consideration. When the First Committee of the General Assembly, by a unanimous decision, agreed to treat the Korean question as a matter of urgency, its decision reflected the concern of all members of the United Nations, a concern which I am sure is shared by the peoples of the world, over the tragedy of war and devastation in Korea, and their deep desire to bring this war to an end on terms acceptable to both sides.

To this end negotiations have been proceeding for some 16 months at Panmunjom, in the course of which a wide measure of agreement on the terms of an armistice has been reached.

The sole remaining issue which has not been settled in the course of these armistice negotiations concerns the principles and procedures by which the repatriation of prisoners of war can be effected.²

In itself, the prisoners-of-war issue is a challenge to the fundamental humanitarian instincts which are shared by all mankind and urgently calls for solution. In camps on both sides, human beings have been kept for long months under military detention while the lengthy negotiations concerning their fate have been continuing. There is an inescapable moral obligation on both sides in the Korean conflict to make every possible effort to insure that these prisoners of war shall be free to return to their homelands, and their speedy return facilitated.

The discussion of this matter in the First Committee of this Assembly has made clear the general

¹ For text of this resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 916.

² For an analysis of the prisoner-of-war issue by Secretary Acheson, see BULLETIN of Nov. 10, 1952, p. 744.

agreed
should
prison
of the
of pri
well-e
nation
the dr

It w
war s
detain
that t
right
incons
that a
to the
of war
Fin
Genev
izing
the rel
homel
The
the ab
of the
makes
chiner

It r
ernme
whose
The r
cause
an arm
tion of

The
the des
facilit
vening
in arti
ready

Panmu
It is
Govern
will ac
sembly

mainin
of an
munjo

Once
to brin
progra
ing, w
ment v
in the

The
thing
Korea
tral Pe
be ach
mitted

hope v
which

Janua

agreement in the United Nations that this problem should be dealt with and the repatriation of prisoners of war should be effected under the terms of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of Aug. 12, 1949, under the well-established principles and practice of international law, and under the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement.

It was also generally agreed that prisoners of war should be released from the custody of the detaining powers to a repatriation commission so that they can be free to exercise their undoubted right with respect to repatriation, and that it was inconsistent with common humanitarian principles that a detaining power should offer any hindrance to the return to their homelands of any prisoners of war.

Finally, there was general agreement that the Geneva Convention cannot be construed as authorizing a detaining power to employ force to effect the return of individual prisoners of war to their homelands.

The General Assembly resolution clearly states the above principles with respect to the solution of the prisoner-of-war issue and, in addition, makes concrete proposals with regard to the machinery of repatriation.

It represents ideas put forward by many governments represented in the General Assembly, whose unanimous desire is to bring peace to Korea. The resolution can make this desire effective because its acceptance will make it possible to achieve an armistice and a complete and immediate cessation of hostilities.

The resolution, in addition, makes reference to the desire of the General Assembly to expedite and facilitate, once an armistice is effective, the convening of a political conference as provided for in article 60 of the draft armistice agreement already accepted by the military negotiators at Panmunjom.

It is my earnest hope that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China will accept these proposals of the General Assembly as a basis for the solution of the one remaining issue which has prevented the conclusion of an armistice during the negotiations at Panmunjom.

Once this issue is solved, it will become possible to bring the fighting to an end and complete the program for a peaceful settlement in Korea leading, we must hope, toward a more general settlement which would contribute to peace in Asia and in the world.

The United Nations is determined to do everything possible to bring the fighting to an end in Korea. This is also the declared aim of the Central People's Government. This common aim can be achieved if the proposals which are now submitted for your consideration are, as I earnestly hope will be the case, accepted in the spirit in which they are put forward.

In this hope, as President of the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, I appeal to you to accept these proposals of the United Nations as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement which will serve to bring about a constructive and durable peace in Korea.

I shall look forward to receiving as soon as possible your reply to this communication, which I shall report to the General Assembly when it is received.

In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the text of the resolution has also been communicated to the North Korean authorities, to whom I am sending a similar message.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

LESTER B. PEARSON,
President of the General Assembly.

Chinese Communist Reply of December 14

[Excerpts]

I have received your cable of Dec. 5, 1952, which communicated the text of the resolution based on the draft resolution of the Indian delegation and adopted on Dec. 3, 1952, by the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, under the item of its agenda entitled "Korea: Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea."

I am hereby authorized to make the following reply on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, after illegally adopting in February 1951 the shameful and calumnious resolution slandering China as an aggressor, has now, in the absence of the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Korean Democratic People's Republic, discussed the Korean question and adopted a resolution supporting the United States Government's position of forcibly retaining in captivity prisoners of war in contravention of international conventions, and facilitating its continuation and expansion of the war raging in Korea. Such an action is clearly illegal and void and is firmly opposed by the Chinese people.

This illegal resolution adopted by the General Assembly is based on the Indian draft resolution, having as its basic content the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war [and] does not correspond to the description in your cable that it deals with the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war "under the terms of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of Aug. 12, 1949, under the well-established principles and practice of international law, and under the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement."

Quite to the contrary, it is entirely based on the so-called principles of "voluntary repatriation," all of which are in essence the "principle

of forcibly retaining in captivity prisoners of war, a principle which the United States side has unjustifiably maintained ever since Oct. 11, 1951, when the Korean armistice negotiations entered into discussion on the prisoner-of-war item on the agenda and which is universally recognized as violating the Geneva Convention and international law.

Department's Comment on Communist Rejection of Peace in Korea

Press release 919 dated December 15

The United States has learned with deep regret that the Chinese Communists have flouted the solemnly expressed views of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They have rejected the fair and reasonable proposals contained in the resolution on Korea adopted with the approval of 54 members of the United Nations.

Thus the Communists have again rejected peace in Korea. The U.S. Government has no doubt that other governments share the deep concern of the United States over this rejection and the 54 governments which supported the General Assembly resolution will wish to give careful consideration to the situation confronting the United Nations.

During more than 15 months of negotiation in the field by the U. N. Command delegation and the extensive discussions in the General Assembly, the United Nations has shown its determination to take every practicable step to bring about an armistice in Korea which would end the hostilities on a basis consistent with the humanitarian principles of the United Nations.

The U.S. Government reaffirms its determination to continue to fulfill its responsibilities in Korea. The U.N. Command remains ready to meet again with the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom whenever they accept the proposals contained in the U.N. resolution or any of the other numerous proposals which have been made to them by the U.N. Command, or whenever they advance constructive proposals of their own which could lead to an honorable armistice. However, there can be no compromise with the basic humanitarian principles contained in the resolution of the General Assembly of December 3, 1952. If the Communists accept these basic U.N. principles, the proposals now outstanding provide numerous alternative methods for settling the question of prisoners of war. Until the Communists accept these basic U.N. principles, the U.S. Government cannot see what useful purpose will be served by having the United Nations propose to the Communists still other plans for implementing these principles.

The responsibility for whether there shall be peace in Korea clearly lies with the Chinese Communists and North Korean authorities and their supporters.

All countries, in and outside the United States, whether they are for or against the Indian draft resolution, consider that this draft resolution supports the "principle of no forcible repatriation" maintained by the United States Government. Even Mr. Krishna Menon, the Indian delegate to the United Nations who tabled the illegal resolution, himself makes no attempt to hide this.

Such an illegal resolution based on the so-called

principle of "voluntary repatriation" or "no forcible repatriation" cannot possibly settle what you describe in your cable as "the sole remaining issue which has not been settled in the course of these armistice negotiations," namely, "the principles and procedures by which the repatriation of prisoners of war can be effected."

If the United States had adhered to the draft armistice agreement instead of deliberately inventing the so-called principle of "voluntary repatriation" or "no forcible repatriation" as an excuse to obstruct an armistice in Korea, then, this "sole remaining issue which has not been settled," would long ago have been satisfactorily settled, and the Korean war, which is a matter of common concern to the people of the whole world, would long ago have been brought to an end.

The resolution which you forwarded bases itself not only on the so-called principle of "voluntary repatriation" or "no forcible repatriation," but also on the hypothesis that there are actually some among the Korean and Chinese captured personnel who "refuse to return home" to rejoin their families and lead a peaceful life. This does not accord in the slightest with human nature; still less does it square with facts.

The facts are that the United States has long since flagrantly cast aside the provisions of Article 17 and other articles of the Geneva Convention regarding the humane treatment of prisoners of [war] and has in the prisoner-of-war camps under its control placed large numbers of United States, Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek special agents in responsible posts and has even planted Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek special agents posing as Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, to coerce prisoners of war to make declarations "refusing repatriation" and of "unwillingness to return home," by frequent recourse to so-called "persuasion," "screening," "rescreening" and "interrogation" of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war—measures effected by such utterly savage and inhuman methods as torture, massacre and mass starvation.

In reality, prisoners of war are those combatants of one side who are under the armed control and at the forcible disposal of their enemy and have no freedom. Release and repatriation is a right to which all prisoners of war of both sides are entitled as soon as an armistice comes into effect—that is, they should be freed from the armed control of the enemy and be returned to their own side so that they may regain their freedom and return to their homeland to lead a peaceful life.

Since prisoners of war are entitled to such rights, how can [there] be such a question as "forcible repatriation"—or "return to their homeland effected by force?" The unfounded argument that "a detaining power may not employ force to effect the return of individual prisoners of war to their homelands" cannot hold water. It can find no basis whatever in the Geneva Convention.

It is
resolut
the inc
world
the "so
States
oners
shall n
of war
taken
damen
The
final a
final a
war al
tremel
who sp
in the
the Un
in the
To p
a circ
many
adopt
Panmu
States
in term
the pec
zation
to forc
violati
Gen.
Korean
comm
their l
the Un
war be
over d
and th
explan
Taki
mentio
able p
armed
the pro
repatri
with h
tice, th
agreem
From
illegal
counte
lates h
tice as
Conven
is unre
of the
a "desir
most br
insists c

It is evident that the adoption of the illegal resolution by the General Assembly aims to divert the indignation and attention of the people of the world from the criminal terrorism, as evidenced in the "screening" of prisoners of war by the United States, to the so-called question of "forcing prisoners of war to return to their homes," or "force shall not be used to effect the return of prisoners of war to their homelands." All of you who have taken this action are indeed "challenging the fundamental humanitarian instincts."

The proposal to give the United Nations the final authority of appointing the umpire and the final authority of disposing of those prisoners of war allegedly "unwilling to go home" is really extremely absurd. Can it be that those delegates who sponsored and adopted the illegal resolution in the United Nations have really forgotten that the United Nations is one of the belligerent parties in the Korean war?

To put it more frankly, having passed through a circuitous course in which resort was made to many deceitful tactics, these provisions actually adopt in full the three proposals put forward at Panmunjom on Sept. 28, 1952, by the United States. None the less, these provisions are couched in terms more sly in order to deceive more easily the people of the world and to facilitate the realization of the United States Government's scheme to forcibly retain in captivity prisoners of war in violation of international conventions.

Gen. Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Gen. Peng Teh-Huai, commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, in their letter of Oct. 16, 1952,^{*} to General Clark of the United States, proposed that all prisoners of war be brought to a demilitarized zone to be handed over directly to and accepted by the other side, and that repatriation be effected after visits and explanations.

Taking into account the complicated situation mentioned above, these proposals first of all enable prisoners of war to be released from the armed control of the opposite side, to give them the protection of their own side, so that the total repatriation of prisoners of war in accordance with humanitarian principles, international practice, the Geneva Convention and the [armistice] agreement can be assured.

From the above, it can be clearly seen that the illegal resolution is unreasonable because it runs counter to the conscience of man, completely violates humanitarian principles, international practice as well as the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the draft-armistice agreement; it is unreasonable because it recognizes the "desire" of the prisoners of war to "refuse repatriation," a "desire" created by the United States side by the most brutal methods; it is unreasonable because it insists on the retaining in captivity of tens of thou-

sands of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war as hostages in order to force the Korean and Chinese side to yield to the United States; it is unfair because it deliberately attempts to impose on the Korean and Chinese side the utterly groundless "principle of voluntary repatriation" which the United States has maintained throughout and because it rejected without any reason the proposal of the Korean and Chinese side for the repatriation of all prisoners of war in adherence to the Geneva Convention, and the proposal of the delegation of the Soviet Union for the immediate and complete cessation of hostilities in Korea prior to the settlement of the question of the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

In view of these facts, I cannot but inform you solemnly that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China considers that such an illegal resolution cannot possibly provide "a just and reasonable basis for an agreement."

On the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war, the Central People's Government considers that the Korean and Chinese side is at once correct and just, fair and reasonable in insisting on the principle of total repatriation, a principle which is in conformity with humanitarian principles and the Geneva Convention. The settlement of the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war in the Korean armistice negotiations must and can only be achieved on the basis of the Geneva Convention.

Your cable devoted considerable verbiage to an attempt to show that by adopting this illegal resolution which has as its basic content the United States "principle of voluntary repatriation" under an Indian cloak, all of you earnestly desire a speedy conclusion to the Korean war. However, this illegal resolution which you forwarded fully demonstrates that it abjectly submits to the brutal will of the United States Government which uses violence to carry through the forcible retaining in captivity of prisoners of war so that the Korean armistice negotiations might be broken off and sabotaged and that the Korean war might be prolonged and expanded.

All of you are not doing everything possible to bring the fighting to an end in Korea. You are doing everything possible to induce and coerce some of the nations represented in the General Assembly to endorse jointly the policy of the United States of no armistice, no negotiations, and no peaceful settlement but the prolongation and expansion of the Korean war. At the same time, all of you attempt further to shift the responsibility for the failure to end the war to the Korean and Chinese side. It can be positively stated that this attempt of yours to shift responsibility will be of no avail.

If, as you said in your cable, the General Assembly's "unanimous desire is to bring peace to Korea," then it should insist upon the principle of the total repatriation of prisoners of war as

^{*} *Ibid.*, p. 752.

embodied in the Geneva Convention and international law.

It should sternly demand that the United States side immediately resume the negotiations at Panmunjom, and with the proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question submitted by Mr. Vyshinsky, delegate of the Soviet Union, on the 10th and 24th of November⁴ as a basis, bring about the accomplishment of a complete cease-fire on the part of the belligerent parties in accordance with the draft Korean armistice agreement already agreed upon by both sides as a first step; and then refer for settlement the question of the total repatriation of prisoners of war, together with the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, to the Commission for the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question, composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the Korean Democratic People's Republic and South Korea.

If such a procedure is followed, an armistice in Korea can be immediately achieved, and the distress of the Korean peoples as well as the casualties on both sides can be brought to an end. Thus, the General Assembly can indeed speedily "bring peace to Korea."

However, the present session of the General Assembly has already rejected such a fair and reasonable proposal which can really lead to peace. I, hereby, once again make the following proposal: To realize the fervent desire for peace of the people of the world, to demonstrate the sincerity of the Chinese people for an early restoration of peace in Korea, and to preclude the further use of the prisoner repatriation issue as an obstacle and pretext in the realization of an armistice in Korea, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China requests that the General Assembly rescind the illegal resolution which you forwarded, call upon the United States Government to resume immediately the negotiations at Panmunjom, and with the draft Korean armistice agreement as a basis, to bring about the realization of a complete armistice as a first step and then to refer for settlement the question of the total repatriation of prisoners of war to the above-mentioned "Commission for the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question."

If the General Assembly agrees to discuss this request, then representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Korean Democratic People's Republic must take part in the discussions.

Should the General Assembly reject even such a just request, and still persist in maintaining the illegal resolution which aims at supporting the United States Government in forcibly retaining in captivity prisoners of war in violation of inter-

national conventions, then it would further demonstrate that your purpose, far from being the achievement of peace in Korea and the Far East, is nothing but the continuation and expansion of the Korean war so that peace in the Far East and throughout the world can be further disrupted at some future date. This would all the more expose the United Nations as increasingly becoming a tool of the ruling clique of the United States in its preparations for war and for the expansion of aggression.

All those who support the war policies of the ruling clique of the United States must bear the grave responsibility for the consequences of such action.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Inter-Agency Agreements and Agreements Between Agencies and Other Inter-Governmental Organizations. Draft agreement between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Council of Europe. E/2338, Nov. 4, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo. Twelfth Report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination to the Economic and Social Council. E/2340, Nov. 11, 1952. 18 pp. mimeo. General Progress Report of the Executive Director. International Field Staff of UNICEF and Other U.N. Agencies Available for Development and Implementation of UNICEF-Aided Programmes in 1953. E/ICEF/205/Add. 1, Oct. 4, 1952. 8 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

Repatriation of Greek Children. Note by the Secretary-General. A/2236, Oct. 23, 1952. 74 pp. mimeo; Report of the Secretary-General. A/2241, Oct. 30, 1952. 10 pp. mimeo. Question of the Adoption by the Economic and Social Council and Its Functional Commissions of Spanish as a Working Language. Sixth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the seventh session of the General Assembly. A/2242, Oct. 31, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

A regular feature, will be resumed in a subsequent issue.

⁴ U.N. docs. A/C.1/729, A/C.1/729/ Rev. 1/Corr. 1/ Add. 1.

Presic
to the

White Ho

Idem
aid to
have b
Kellar,
U.S. Se
mittee
nally, C
U.S. S
mittee
tives;
Armed
James
eign A
of the

DEAR M

I hav
mary s
from th
various
of long
the ship

The
made b
provisi
Control
213, 82
took pl
of item
trator
goed to
purpose

Thus
Under
either
financia
France
contin

The
to term

First
excepti
nomic,
after th
of the
arms, a

January

President's Decision on Continuance of Aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy

White House press release dated December 30

Identical letters regarding continuance of U.S. aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have been sent by the President to Kenneth McKellar, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate; Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate; Tom Connally, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate; Clarence Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives; Carl Vinson, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives; and James P. Richards, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. The text of the letter follows:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I have been informed that certain goods of primary strategic significance have been shipped from the United Kingdom, France, and Italy to various countries of the Soviet Bloc in fulfillment of long-standing obligations. The total value of the shipments is \$2.5 million.

The commitments to deliver these goods were made before the effective date of the embargo provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), Public Law 213, 82nd Congress. But the actual shipments took place after that date. And they consisted of items which have been listed by the Administrator of the Act as items that should be embargoed to the Soviet Bloc in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act.

Thus I have been faced with a grave decision. Under Section 103 (b) of the statute I am required either to terminate all military, economic, and financial assistance to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, or to direct that assistance be continued in spite of the shipments.

The provisions of the Battle Act with respect to termination of aid are as follows:

First, the Act requires—with no possibility of exception—the termination of all military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation which, after the effective date of the embargo provisions of the Act, knowingly permits the shipment of arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic

energy materials to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination.

The shipments made by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy were not arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials, and indeed the Administrator informs me that to his knowledge no country receiving assistance from the United States has made any shipments of that kind whatever.

In addition the Act provides for the termination of aid to any country that knowingly permits the shipment to the same nations of petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, or items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. However, in cases involving items of those types (known as "Title I, Category B" items), the President may direct the continuance of aid to the country permitting the shipment "when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States." The President may make such a determination after receiving the advice of the Administrator and after taking into account these four considerations: "the contribution of such country to the mutual security of the free world, the importance of such assistance to the security of the United States, the strategic importance of imports received from countries of the Soviet bloc, and the adequacy of such country's controls over the export to the Soviet bloc of items of strategic importance."

The Administrator, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, who is also the Director for Mutual Security, has advised me that aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy should be continued. He made this recommendation after consulting with the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce; the Office of Defense Mobilization, Mutual Security Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency.

Upon his advice, and after taking into account the four statutory considerations listed above, I have directed the continuance of assistance to the

United Kingdom, France, and Italy. The rest of this letter will explain my reasons for so doing.

The "Prior Commitments" Problem

Up until the present case, there have been three decisions to continue aid to countries which had knowingly permitted shipments prescribed under the Battle Act.¹ In those three cases the United States continued its aid to:

The Netherlands, which had permitted certain oil drilling equipment to be shipped to Poland; Italy, which had permitted a grinding machine to be shipped to Rumania; Denmark, which had permitted a tanker to be shipped to the U.S.S.R.

Those cases all involved "prior commitments"—that is, commitments made before the Battle Act embargo lists went into effect on January 24, 1952. The shipments of \$2.5 million which now have been made by the British, French, and Italians also were in fulfillment of prior commitments. Still more of these commitments remain on the books of Western European countries. The problem of how to handle these obligations has been one of the most difficult issues that has arisen in the administration of the Battle Act.

The first question to be faced was whether the Act applies to such commitments at all. The Act prohibits further assistance (unless a Presidential exception is made) when a country "knowingly permits" the shipment of items included in the Title I, Category B embargo list. In many cases, the countries in question had entered into trade agreements guaranteeing that they would permit the shipment of these items, and in other cases had issued, or promised to issue, export licenses covering such shipments. Thus there is a real question, especially in those countries where an export license cannot legally be revoked, whether the knowing permission had not been given at the time the foreign government signed the trade agreement or issued the export license. If it had been given at that time, the subsequent shipment would not be relevant, since the knowing permission had taken place before January 24, 1952, the effective date of the embargo list. If the Act were so construed, aid could be continued to such a country without a Presidential determination that continuance of aid was necessary.

Despite the legal ambiguity surrounding this question, however, the Administrator has construed the Act as being applicable to all *shipments* of embargoed items after the effective date, even though the *permission* was given beforehand. I concur in this interpretation. It is the interpretation that seems to be most closely in accord with the objectives of the Act, which are to increase the strength of the United States and the coop-

erating nations and to impede the military ability of the Soviet Bloc. The contrary interpretation also raises certain questions as to inequality of treatment, based perhaps on nothing more substantial than the fortuitous timing of the issuance of an export license.

For the Western European countries, however, the prospect of breaking firm contracts, made in good faith, raised serious problems. The governments of these countries pointed out that East-West trade is basically the exchanging of Eastern raw materials for Western finished metal products, and that this involves a considerable time differential in deliveries. The Soviet Bloc had placed contracts months, and even years, before many of the items now requiring embargo under the Battle Act were agreed to be strategic by most countries, and also before the invasion of Korea in 1950. In many cases the Soviet Bloc had carried out its portion of the exchange by making deliveries of timber, grains, coal, and other essential commodities, and was awaiting shipment of goods which, in effect, had already been paid for. The manufactured products, because of the time differential, were scheduled for delivery to the East in 1952, 1953, and 1954.

The Western European countries attach importance to the fulfillment of their formal trade obligations to the Soviet Bloc. They point out that the Communists constantly seek to picture the Western World as morally bankrupt and bent on the destruction of peaceful relations with the Soviet Bloc. They feel therefore that the moral position of the Western World in this battle of ideas would be weakened by outright violation of clear commitments.

Despite the force of these contentions, the United States requested the Western European countries concerned to freeze their shipments of prior commitment items, so that a joint review of the problem could be undertaken. This request led to an intensive review. As a result, the Western European countries decided that some of the projected shipments could be eliminated without prejudice to the foregoing considerations. The eliminated shipments involved about one-quarter of the outstanding prior commitments.

The three Battle Act exceptions already granted for the Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark total \$3.3 million.

Additional items valued at about \$2.5 million now have been shipped. These are the British, French, and Italian shipments with respect to which I now have made a determination that aid should be continued. The shipments originated as follows: United Kingdom, \$583,818; France, \$959,245; and Italy, \$940,000.

The items shipped from the United Kingdom were forging machines, special metal-working machines, pumps, valves, rolling mill equipment, balances, locomotives and parts, specialized testing devices, ball and roller bearings, industrial

¹ For texts of the President's letters regarding these decisions, see BULLETIN of May 5, 1952, p. 720; *ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 75; and *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 198.

greases and oils, a small quantity of nickel, and one blower. The items shipped from France were boring machines, valves, chemical equipment, compressors, electronic equipment, aluminum, and ball bearings. The items shipped from Italy were rolling mill equipment and ball and roller bearings. (See Appendix for a list of the items, their values, and their destinations.)

There remain a number of other prior commitments on the books not only of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy but also of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany. If further shipments of this kind take place, the United States Government will examine such cases on their merits and determine the appropriate action in the light of all the circumstances.

Why the Cessation of Aid Would Be Detrimental to the Security of the United States

Following are the considerations, specified in the Battle Act, which have led to the conclusion that unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States.

A. Contribution of those countries to the mutual security of the Free World

All the countries associated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are important to the success of the common undertaking. But the United Kingdom, France, and Italy are the three largest European members of NATO and the vital importance of their participation can scarcely be exaggerated. In their foreign policies they support, as a basic principle, action directed toward the military and economic integration of Western Europe. By reason of their geographical locations, their industrial capacity, their armed forces and their other resources, they are in a position to make, and they are making, contributions of the greatest value to the security of the Free World.

In two world wars the United Kingdom has shown its determination to fight for its democratic way of life, and has, in those wars, borne the shock of combat in the early stages. In this sense it has in effect been a first bastion of defense for the Free World. Its example during the dark days of 1940 and 1941 when it stood, with the Commonwealth, practically alone was one that cheered free men everywhere. France, the traditional ally of the United States from the time of the American Revolution, has likewise stood in the forefront of those willing to fight for a way of life that respected the dignity of the free individual. And Italy, despite a dark period in its history, has in recent years aligned itself firmly with the free nations of the world, and in the face of formidable obstacles has made a contribution of great value.

Together, the United Kingdom and France ac-

count for about four-fifths of the defense expenditures of the European NATO countries. Their share of the total production of military equipment is even higher. They rank highest among those countries in the percentage of gross national product devoted to defense spending.

The United Kingdom makes almost half of the defense expenditures of the European NATO countries. The United Kingdom and the United States have cooperated with each other in a manner unique in the history of nations. Common defense policies have been developed, and the practice of consultation that was undertaken during the last war has made possible a coordinated defense which is a cornerstone of United States security. The air bases in the British Isles are a key element in the Free World's system of defense. The British fleet, together with that of the United States, stands in defense of our shores as well as theirs. The British merchant marine furnishes the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, with lines of supply. On the continent of Europe the British have the largest armored force of any NATO country, including the United States.

France, a country which has been the battlefield of both world wars, which has seen the best of its youth depleted by those wars, which has undergone the anguish of enemy occupation, and which has been forced to struggle bitterly for its economic health, is second only to the United Kingdom among European NATO countries in defense expenditures and in output of military equipment. The vast communications network upon which the common effort depends is centered in France. While making its defense contribution in Europe, France is carrying the burden of a war against Communists in Indo-China. Into that war it has poured a vast sum of money and the pick of its trained officers.

Italy's contribution to the common security is in a sense one of the most noteworthy on the continent. For out of the wreckage of fascism has arisen a resolute government determined to play a major part in the struggle for freedom. Having experienced the evil of totalitarianism, Italy has resolved to stand on the side of freedom and to defend that freedom. Its natural resources are few. The social pressures which are the outcome of the poverty and distress of the masses have been intensified by years of totalitarian rule. Nevertheless, and despite the presence of a Communist party that feeds on the poverty of the country, the Italian Government has taken firm steps to preserve its internal security. It has modernized its military installations. In its harbors are based the NATO Mediterranean command, and its communications and supply facilities are of incalculable value.

The factories of these three countries produce goods and services needed by the NATO forces, and this production is given priority over civilian

needs. By June 30, 1952, the United States had placed contracts with European manufacturers for \$684 million of equipment to be used by NATO and the United States military forces. About half this amount is coming from France, with Italy and the United Kingdom having the next largest shares. In the year ending June 30, 1953, additional contracts of \$1 billion are expected to be let in Europe.

B. Importance to the security of the United States of assistance to those countries

The security of the United States is squarely based on the unity of the Western nations and the continued strengthening of their free institutions.

In like manner the effectiveness of the contribution that the United Kingdom, France, and Italy can make toward that unity and strength is dependent at the present time on assistance from the United States.

Since the end of World War II the United States has given net grants and credits to Western Europe that amount to \$23.1 billion in economic aid and \$2.7 billion in military aid—a total of about \$25.8 billion. Of the economic aid, \$6.4 billion went to the United Kingdom, \$4.5 billion to France, and \$2.4 billion to Italy. Those three countries also received large shares of United States military assistance.

All this aid represents an investment directly in the interests of United States security. To terminate aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy would seriously impair that security because it would jeopardize the effectiveness of the free nations' first line of defense in Europe. Our assistance is indispensable to the three countries; without it they would be unable to carry the military burdens they have assumed in NATO. Moreover, since the plans developed in NATO are integrated plans which depend for their success on the continued performance of these countries, the collapse of their defense efforts would mean the collapse of the whole NATO system. We would be imperiling a \$25 billion investment in Western defense for a consideration of \$2.5 million worth of shipments which already have gone to the Soviet Bloc. Regrettable as these shipments may be, and important as these commodities may be to the Soviet Bloc, their strategic advantage to the Communists is far outweighed by the damage to our own security that would result from the termination of assistance.

C. Strategic importance of imports received by those countries from the Soviet Bloc

Each of the three, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, has historical trade relationships with one or more of the countries now included in the Soviet Bloc. A certain degree of dependence upon Eastern Europe has been developed, both as a market and a source of supply. The three nations have exchanged their own products for

essential coal, grain, foodstuffs, and other commodities. If these countries were forced to shift to other sources of supply, the shift would require the expenditure of more dollars, which these countries do not have.

The United Kingdom can produce only 40 percent of its own food supply. It is thus dependent on imports to feed its population. Since the end of World War II the United Kingdom has obtained very important quantities of coarse grains and timber products from the Soviet Bloc. The coarse grains, through the increase in domestically produced meats and poultry products, have made a vital contribution to the diet of the British people. The timber products have helped to provide adequate housing for a significant number of British families; and such items as pit props have assisted directly in the increase of coal production.

If the British did not obtain these important items from the Soviet Bloc, they would either have to procure them largely in dollar areas or go without. If they decided to procure these items in dollar areas, they would almost inevitably have to reduce their defense expenditures in order to obtain the needed dollars. If they decided to go without, they would have to worsen an already austere standard of living. Either alternative would weaken the British contribution to the common defense.

A somewhat similar pattern exists in both France and Italy—made more difficult in both these countries, however, by the presence of large and vocal Communist groups. The Communist propaganda line has long been that refusal to trade with Eastern Europe has placed severe hardships on Western Europeans by cutting them off from important supplies traditionally purchased in Eastern Europe.

Italy still depends on the Soviet Bloc for supplies of such vital imports as coal, manganese, iron and steel, wheat and foodstuffs. Italy normally imports about nine-tenths of its coal requirements, and in 1951 the Bloc supplied 12½ percent of Italy's coal imports and 11 percent of coke imports. Also in 1951 the Bloc supplied 6.5 percent of Italy's manganese imports, 7 percent of its pig iron imports, over 12 percent of wheat imports, and almost 20 percent of other grains including rye, barley, and oats.

France, too, gets important quantities of certain essential imports from the Soviet Bloc, such as certain types of coal, although France's total trade with the Bloc is not as large as Italy's or Britain's. In 1951 France received from the Bloc almost 10 percent of its coal and coke imports, 8½ percent of its total glycerine imports, and 10 percent of its asbestos imports.

Part of the reason why Western Europe has been able to reduce its dependence on Eastern supplies to these levels, and hence withstand to a marked degree the Soviet Bloc pressures for strategic items, has been the existence of United States

aid. If we were suddenly to withdraw this aid, the flow of strategic goods and services to the Iron Curtain areas would be bound to increase. This would defeat the purpose of the Battle Act, not contribute to it.

D. Adequacy of British, French, and Italian controls over the export of strategic items to the Soviet Bloc

Failure to abrogate all their prior commitments should not be allowed to obscure the fact that these three countries have long operated effective controls over strategic items and have prevented the shipment of large quantities of these items to the Soviet Bloc. The British, in fact, enacted controls before the United States did so. Many improvements can undoubtedly be made in some controls systems, and work along these lines is in progress. These countries have been important participants in international discussions of controls—a cooperative program that is unprecedented.

In deciding whether to terminate aid in these cases, I have been guided by the basic objectives of the Act—to strengthen the security of the United States and of the Free World. This Government has sought constantly to avoid placing weapons in the hands of the Soviet Bloc with which to attack the Free World. But weapons take various forms. They may be commodities of strategic importance; they may be hunger or discontent within the borders of friendly countries; or they may be discord between our allies and ourselves. We must guard against giving the Soviet Bloc any of these weapons. It is my firm conviction that the decision to continue aid in these cases best serves the security interests of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

APPENDIX

FRANCE

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc After Jan. 24, 1952

| Item | Quantity | Destination | Value |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| Boring machines..... | 3..... | 1 Poland; 2 Czechoslovakia. | \$768,240 |
| Specialized chemical equipment..... | 3 units..... | Poland..... | 35,868 |
| Chemical processing equipment..... | 2 shipments..... | Poland..... | 14,360 |
| Compressors..... | | Poland..... | 38,001 |
| Valves..... | | Poland..... | 29,167 |
| Electronic equipment..... | | Poland..... | 4,789 |
| Bearings..... | | Poland..... | 37,320 |
| Aluminum..... | 50 tons..... | Poland..... | 31,500 |
| Total..... | | | \$959,245 |

UNITED KINGDOM

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc After Jan. 24, 1952

| Item | Quantity | Destination | Value |
|---|-----------------------|---|-----------|
| Forging machines..... | 9..... | 5 U. S. S. R.; 4 Poland. | \$188,892 |
| Specialized metal working machines..... | 2..... | Poland..... | 6,418 |
| Pumps..... | 4..... | Poland..... | 760 |
| Valves..... | 40..... | Poland..... | 12,192 |
| Rolling mill equipment..... | | Poland..... | 25,144 |
| Rolling mill equipment..... | | Hungary..... | 87,682 |
| Blower..... | 1..... | Poland..... | 63,913 |
| Balances..... | 7..... | U. S. S. R..... | 2,752 |
| Specialized testing devices..... | 7..... | 1 Hungary; 3 Poland; 3 U. S. S. R. | 26,501 |
| Ball and roller bearings..... | 1008..... | 17 Poland; 10 Hungary; 981 Czechoslovakia. | 19,003 |
| Nickel..... | 86 kilograms..... | Poland..... | 654 |
| Lubricating oils and greases..... | 50 gals..... | China..... | 66 |
| Mineral oil..... | 17.9 tons..... | Poland..... | 1,809 |
| Lubricating oils..... | 196 gals., 7 cwt..... | Poland..... | 190 |
| Transformer oils..... | 18,000 gals..... | Poland..... | 14,000 |
| Insulating oils..... | 100 gals..... | Poland..... | 126 |
| Greases and oils..... | 6 gals., 12 oz..... | Poland..... | 20 |
| Locomotives and parts..... | | \$100,511 Poland; 32,230 Hungary; 955 Czechoslovakia. | 133,696 |
| Total..... | | | \$583,818 |

ITALY

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc After Jan. 24, 1952

| Item | Quantity | Destination | Value |
|---|----------|---------------------|-----------|
| Centreless grinding machine (exception previously granted)..... | 1..... | Rumania..... | \$11,000 |
| Rolling mill parts..... | | Poland..... | 440,000 |
| Ball and roller bearings..... | | Czechoslovakia..... | 500,000 |
| Total..... | | | 951,000 |
| Exception previously granted..... | | | 11,000 |
| Net..... | | | \$940,000 |

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc After Jan. 24, 1952

| Country | Amount |
|---------------------|-------------|
| United Kingdom..... | \$583,818 |
| France..... | 959,245 |
| Italy..... | 940,000 |
| Total..... | \$2,483,063 |

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Harold G. Kissick as Chief of the Division of International Conferences, effective November 9.

Harold F. Linder as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective December 12.

| | | |
|--|--------|--|
| American Republics | | |
| Review of progress in Latin America (Rowe) . . . | 47 | |
| Asia | | |
| INDIA: | | |
| Point Four agreement for malaria control . . . | 55 | |
| Loan for expansion of iron and steel produc- tion . . . | 54 | |
| KASHMIR: U.S. reaffirms position on Kashmir question . . . | 73 | |
| KOREA: U.S. position on Icac's proposals rela- tive to Kije-do incident . . . | 52 | |
| Communism | | |
| Chinese Communists reject U.N. proposals on prisoners of war . . . | 74 | |
| Europe | | |
| AUSTRIA: U.N. support for early settlement, text of treaty resolution . . . | 67 | |
| President's decision on continuance of aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy . . . | 79 | |
| U.S.S.R.: Soviets say "wrong address" in reply to U.S. notes on Hungarian plane incident . . . | 51 | |
| Witnessing the birth of a new Europe (Cowen) . . . | 48 | |
| Foreign Policy | | |
| U.S. foreign policy in review (Truman) . . . | 43 | |
| Industry | | |
| Loan for expansion of iron and steel production in India . . . | 54 | |
| Mutual Aid and Defense | | |
| President's decision on continuance of aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy . . . | 79 | |
| Near and Middle East | | |
| PALESTINE: General Assembly's role in the question (Jessup) . . . | 70 | |
| SAUDI ARABIA: Point Four . . . | 56 | |
| SYRIA: Letter of credence . . . | 56 | |
| Presidential Documents | | |
| CORRESPONDENCE: President's decision on continuance of aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy . . . | 79 | |
| EXECUTIVE ORDERS: | | |
| Administration of Tinian and Saipan . . . | 46 | |
| U.N. appointments . . . | 62 | |
| Prisoners of War | | |
| Chinese Communists reject U.N. proposals on prisoners of war . . . | 74 | |
| U.S. position on Icac's proposals relative to Kije-do incident . . . | 52 | |
| Protection of U.S. Nationals and Property | | |
| Soviets say "wrong address" in reply to U.S. notes on Hungarian plane incident . . . | 51 | |
| Refugees and Displaced Persons | | |
| Migration Committee to expand services in 1953 . . . | 64 | |
| State, Department of | | |
| Appointment of officers . . . | 83 | |
| Technical Cooperation and Development | | |
| Point Four agreement for malaria control with India . . . | 55 | |
| Point Four in Saudi Arabia . . . | 56 | |
| Review of progress in Latin America . . . | 47 | |
| Trust Territories | | |
| Administration of Tinian and Saipan, Executive order . . . | 46 | |
| United Nations | | |
| American citizens in the U.N. Secretariat . . . | 57 | |
| Current U.N. documents: a selected bibliog- raphy . . . | 78 | |
| GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Role in the Palestine question . . . | 70 | |
| U.N. support for early Austrian settlement, text of Austrian treaty resolution . . . | 67 | |
| U.S. reaffirms position on Kashmir question . . . | 73 | |
| Name Index | | |
| Acheson, Secretary . . . | 57 | |
| Chou En-lai . . . | 74 | |
| Cohen, Benjamin V. . . . | 67 | |
| Cowen, Myron M. . . . | 48 | |
| Dunaway, John A. . . . | 56 | |
| Hickerson, John D. . . . | 57 | |
| Jessup, Philip C. . . . | 70 | |
| Kissick, Harold G. . . . | 83 | |
| Linder, Harold F. . . . | 83 | |
| Malik, Y. A. . . . | 51 | |
| Pearson, Lester . . . | 74 | |
| Ross, John C. . . . | 73 | |
| Rowe, C. O. . . . | 47 | |
| Truman, President . . . | 43, 79 | |
| Warren, George L. . . . | 64 | |
| Zeineddine, Farid . . . | 56 | |

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: Dec. 30, 1952-Jan. 3, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to Dec. 30 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 919 of Dec. 15, 923 of Dec. 17, 925 of Dec. 18, and 929 of Dec. 22.

| No. | Date | Subject |
|-----|-------|-------------------------------------|
| 931 | 12/30 | Loyalty in U.N. |
| 932 | 12/30 | Acheson letter to Rep. Chelf |
| 933 | 12/30 | Malaria control for India |
| 934 | 12/31 | Hickerson: Loyalty in the U.N. |
| †1 | 1/2 | United Command reports to U.N. |
| 2 | 1/2 | Point Four in Saudi Arabia |
| †3 | 1/2 | Cramer: Caribbean Pt. Four director |
| *4 | 1/3 | Disciplinary action: Kohler |

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.